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insight into the theory of Relativity to those readers who, from a
general scientific and philosophical point of view, are interested in
the theory, but who are not conversant with the mathematical apparatus
of theoretical physics. The work presumes a standard of education
corresponding to that of a university matriculation examination, and,
despite the shortness of the book, a fair amount of patience and force
of will on the part of the reader. The author has spared himself no
pains in his endeavour to present the main ideas in the simplest and
most intelligible form, and on the whole, in the sequence and
connection in which they actually originated. In the interest of
clearness, it appeared to me inevitable that I should repeat myself
frequently, without paying the slightest attention to the elegance of
the presentation. I adhered scrupulously to the precept of that
brilliant theoretical physicist L. Boltzmann, according to whom
matters of elegance ought to be left to the tailor and to the cobbler.
I make no pretence of having withheld from the reader difficulties
which are inherent to the subject. On the other hand, I have purposely
treated the empirical physical foundations of the theory in a
"step-motherly" fashion, so that readers unfamiliar with physics may
not feel like the wanderer who was unable to see the forest for the
trees. May the book bring some one a few happy hours of suggestive
thought!

December, 1916
A. EINSTEIN



PART I

THE SPECIAL THEORY OF RELATIVITY

PHYSICAL MEANING OF GEOMETRICAL PROPOSITIONS


In your schooldays most of you who read this book made acquaintance
with the noble building of Euclid's geometry, and you remember --
perhaps with more respect than love -- the magnificent structure, on
the lofty staircase of which you were chased about for uncounted hours
by conscientious teachers. By reason of our past experience, you would
certainly regard everyone with disdain who should pronounce even the
most out-of-the-way proposition of this science to be untrue. But
perhaps this feeling of proud certainty would leave you immediately if
some one were to ask you: "What, then, do you mean by the assertion
that these propositions are true?" Let us proceed to give this
question a little consideration.

Geometry sets out form certain conceptions such as "plane," "point,"
and "straight line," with which we are able to associate more or less
definite ideas, and from certain simple propositions (axioms) which,
in virtue of these ideas, we are inclined to accept as "true." Then,
on the basis of a logical process, the justification of which we feel
ourselves compelled to admit, all remaining propositions are shown to
follow from those axioms, i.e. they are proven. A proposition is then
correct ("true") when it has been derived in the recognised manner
from the axioms. The question of "truth" of the individual geometrical
propositions is thus reduced to one of the "truth" of the axioms. Now
it has long been known that the last question is not only unanswerable
by the methods of geometry, but that it is in itself entirely without
meaning. We cannot ask whether it is true that only one straight line
goes through two points. We can only say that Euclidean geometry deals
with things called "straight lines," to each of which is ascribed the
property of being uniquely determined by two points situated on it.
The concept "true" does not tally with the assertions of pure
geometry, because by the word "true" we are eventually in the habit of
designating always the correspondence with a "real" object; geometry,
however, is not concerned with the relation of the ideas involved in
it to objects of experience, but only with the logical connection of
these ideas among themselves.

It is not difficult to understand why, in spite of this, we feel
constrained to call the propositions of geometry "true." Geometrical
ideas correspond to more or less exact objects in nature, and these
last are undoubtedly the exclusive cause of the genesis of those
ideas. Geometry ought to refrain from such a course, in order to give
to its structure the largest possible logical unity. The practice, for
example, of seeing in a "distance" two marked positions on a
practically rigid body is something which is lodged deeply in our
habit of thought. We are accustomed further to regard three points as
being situated on a straight line, if their apparent positions can be
made to coincide for observation with one eye, under suitable choice
of our place of observation.

If, in pursuance of our habit of thought, we now supplement the
propositions of Euclidean geometry by the single proposition that two
points on a practically rigid body always correspond to the same
distance (line-interval), independently of any changes in position to
which we may subject the body, the propositions of Euclidean geometry
then resolve themselves into propositions on the possible relative
position of practically rigid bodies.* Geometry which has been
supplemented in this way is then to be treated as a branch of physics.
We can now legitimately ask as to the "truth" of geometrical
propositions interpreted in this way, since we are justified in asking
whether these propositions are satisfied for those real things we have
associated with the geometrical ideas. In less exact terms we can
express this by saying that by the "truth" of a geometrical
proposition in this sense we understand its validity for a
construction with rule and compasses.

Of course the conviction of the "truth" of geometrical propositions in
this sense is founded exclusively on rather incomplete experience. For
the present we shall assume the "truth" of the geometrical
propositions, then at a later stage (in the general theory of
relativity) we shall see that this "truth" is limited, and we shall
consider the extent of its limitation.


  Notes

*) It follows that a natural object is associated also with a
straight line. Three points A, B and C on a rigid body thus lie in a
straight line when the points A and C being given, B is chosen such
that the sum of the distances AB and BC is as short as possible. This
incomplete suggestion will suffice for the present purpose.



THE SYSTEM OF CO-ORDINATES


On the basis of the physical interpretation of distance which has been

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the above considerations. ***

We thus obtain the following result: Every description of events in
space involves the use of a rigid body to which such events have to be
referred. The resulting relationship takes for granted that the laws
of Euclidean geometry hold for "distances;" the "distance" being
represented physically by means of the convention of two marks on a
rigid body.


  Notes

* Here we have assumed that there is nothing left over i.e. that
the measurement gives a whole number. This difficulty is got over by
the use of divided measuring-rods, the introduction of which does not
demand any fundamentally new method.

**A Einstein used "Potsdamer Platz, Berlin" in the original text.
In the authorised translation this was supplemented with "Tranfalgar
Square, London". We have changed this to "Times Square, New York", as
this is the most well known/identifiable location to English speakers
in the present day. [Note by the janitor.]

**B It is not necessary here to investigate further the significance
of the expression "coincidence in space." This conception is
sufficiently obvious to ensure that differences of opinion are
scarcely likely to arise as to its applicability in practice.

*** A refinement and modification of these views does not become
necessary until we come to deal with the general theory of relativity,
treated in the second part of this book.



SPACE AND TIME IN CLASSICAL MECHANICS


The purpose of mechanics is to describe how bodies change their
position in space with "time." I should load my conscience with grave
sins against the sacred spirit of lucidity were I to formulate the
aims of mechanics in this way, without serious reflection and detailed
explanations. Let us proceed to disclose these sins.

It is not clear what is to be understood here by "position" and
"space." I stand at the window of a railway carriage which is
travelling uniformly, and drop a stone on the embankment, without
throwing it. Then, disregarding the influence of the air resistance, I
see the stone descend in a straight line. A pedestrian who observes
the misdeed from the footpath notices that the stone falls to earth in
a parabolic curve. I now ask: Do the "positions" traversed by the
stone lie "in reality" on a straight line or on a parabola? Moreover,
what is meant here by motion "in space" ? From the considerations of
the previous section the answer is self-evident. In the first place we
entirely shun the vague word "space," of which, we must honestly
acknowledge, we cannot form the slightest conception, and we replace
it by "motion relative to a practically rigid body of reference." The
positions relative to the body of reference (railway carriage or
embankment) have already been defined in detail in the preceding
section. If instead of " body of reference " we insert " system of
co-ordinates," which is a useful idea for mathematical description, we
are in a position to say : The stone traverses a straight line
relative to a system of co-ordinates rigidly attached to the carriage,
but relative to a system of co-ordinates rigidly attached to the
ground (embankment) it describes a parabola. With the aid of this
example it is clearly seen that there is no such thing as an
independently existing trajectory (lit. "path-curve"*), but only
a trajectory relative to a particular body of reference.

In order to have a complete description of the motion, we must specify
how the body alters its position with time ; i.e. for every point on
the trajectory it must be stated at what time the body is situated
there. These data must be supplemented by such a definition of time
that, in virtue of this definition, these time-values can be regarded
essentially as magnitudes (results of measurements) capable of
observation. If we take our stand on the ground of classical
mechanics, we can satisfy this requirement for our illustration in the
following manner. We imagine two clocks of identical construction ;
the man at the railway-carriage window is holding one of them, and the
man on the footpath the other. Each of the observers determines the
position on his own reference-body occupied by the stone at each tick
of the clock he is holding in his hand. In this connection we have not
taken account of the inaccuracy involved by the finiteness of the
velocity of propagation of light. With this and with a second
difficulty prevailing here we shall have to deal in detail later.


  Notes

*) That is, a curve along which the body moves.



THE GALILEIAN SYSTEM OF CO-ORDINATES


As is well known, the fundamental law of the mechanics of
Galilei-Newton, which is known as the law of inertia, can be stated
thus: A body removed sufficiently far from other bodies continues in a
state of rest or of uniform motion in a straight line. This law not
only says something about the motion of the bodies, but it also
indicates the reference-bodies or systems of coordinates, permissible
in mechanics, which can be used in mechanical description. The visible
fixed stars are bodies for which the law of inertia certainly holds to
a high degree of approximation. Now if we use a system of co-ordinates
which is rigidly attached to the earth, then, relative to this system,
every fixed star describes a circle of immense radius in the course of
an astronomical day, a result which is opposed to the statement of the
law of inertia. So that if we adhere to this law we must refer these
motions only to systems of coordinates relative to which the fixed
stars do not move in a circle. A system of co-ordinates of which the
state of motion is such that the law of inertia holds relative to it
is called a " Galileian system of co-ordinates." The laws of the
mechanics of Galflei-Newton can be regarded as valid only for a
Galileian system of co-ordinates.



THE PRINCIPLE OF RELATIVITY
(IN THE RESTRICTED SENSE)


In order to attain the greatest possible clearness, let us return to
our example of the railway carriage supposed to be travelling
uniformly. We call its motion a uniform translation ("uniform" because
it is of constant velocity and direction, " translation " because
although the carriage changes its position relative to the embankment
yet it does not rotate in so doing). Let us imagine a raven flying
through the air in such a manner that its motion, as observed from the
embankment, is uniform and in a straight line. If we were to observe
the flying raven from the moving railway carriage. we should find that
the motion of the raven would be one of different velocity and
direction, but that it would still be uniform and in a straight line.
Expressed in an abstract manner we may say : If a mass m is moving
uniformly in a straight line with respect to a co-ordinate system K,
then it will also be moving uniformly and in a straight line relative
to a second co-ordinate system K1 provided that the latter is
executing a uniform translatory motion with respect to K. In
accordance with the discussion contained in the preceding section, it
follows that:

If K is a Galileian co-ordinate system. then every other co-ordinate
system K' is a Galileian one, when, in relation to K, it is in a
condition of uniform motion of translation. Relative to K1 the
mechanical laws of Galilei-Newton hold good exactly as they do with
respect to K.

We advance a step farther in our generalisation when we express the
tenet thus: If, relative to K, K1 is a uniformly moving co-ordinate
system devoid of rotation, then natural phenomena run their course
with respect to K1 according to exactly the same general laws as with
respect to K. This statement is called the principle of relativity (in
the restricted sense).

As long as one was convinced that all natural phenomena were capable
of representation with the help of classical mechanics, there was no
need to doubt the validity of this principle of relativity. But in
view of the more recent development of electrodynamics and optics it
became more and more evident that classical mechanics affords an
insufficient foundation for the physical description of all natural
phenomena. At this juncture the question of the validity of the
principle of relativity became ripe for discussion, and it did not
appear impossible that the answer to this question might be in the
negative.

Nevertheless, there are two general facts which at the outset speak
very much in favour of the validity of the principle of relativity.
Even though classical mechanics does not supply us with a sufficiently
broad basis for the theoretical presentation of all physical
phenomena, still we must grant it a considerable measure of " truth,"
since it supplies us with the actual motions of the heavenly bodies
with a delicacy of detail little short of wonderful. The principle of
relativity must therefore apply with great accuracy in the domain of
mechanics. But that a principle of such broad generality should hold
with such exactness in one domain of phenomena, and yet should be
invalid for another, is a priori not very probable.

We now proceed to the second argument, to which, moreover, we shall
return later. If the principle of relativity (in the restricted sense)
does not hold, then the Galileian co-ordinate systems K, K1, K2, etc.,
which are moving uniformly relative to each other, will not be
equivalent for the description of natural phenomena. In this case we
should be constrained to believe that natural laws are capable of
being formulated in a particularly simple manner, and of course only
on condition that, from amongst all possible Galileian co-ordinate
systems, we should have chosen one (K[0]) of a particular state of
motion as our body of reference. We should then be justified (because
of its merits for the description of natural phenomena) in calling
this system " absolutely at rest," and all other Galileian systems K "
in motion." If, for instance, our embankment were the system K[0] then
our railway carriage would be a system K, relative to which less
simple laws would hold than with respect to K[0]. This diminished
simplicity would be due to the fact that the carriage K would be in
motion (i.e."really")with respect to K[0]. In the general laws of

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We are thus led also to a definition of " time " in physics. For this
purpose we suppose that clocks of identical construction are placed at
the points A, B and C of the railway line (co-ordinate system) and
that they are set in such a manner that the positions of their
pointers are simultaneously (in the above sense) the same. Under these
conditions we understand by the " time " of an event the reading
(position of the hands) of that one of these clocks which is in the
immediate vicinity (in space) of the event. In this manner a
time-value is associated with every event which is essentially capable
of observation.

This stipulation contains a further physical hypothesis, the validity
of which will hardly be doubted without empirical evidence to the
contrary. It has been assumed that all these clocks go at the same
rate if they are of identical construction. Stated more exactly: When
two clocks arranged at rest in different places of a reference-body
are set in such a manner that a particular position of the pointers of
the one clock is simultaneous (in the above sense) with the same
position, of the pointers of the other clock, then identical "
settings " are always simultaneous (in the sense of the above
definition).


  Notes

*) We suppose further, that, when three events A, B and C occur in
different places in such a manner that A is simultaneous with B and B
is simultaneous with C (simultaneous in the sense of the above
definition), then the criterion for the simultaneity of the pair of
events A, C is also satisfied. This assumption is a physical
hypothesis about the the of propagation of light: it must certainly be
fulfilled if we are to maintain the law of the constancy of the
velocity of light in vacuo.



THE RELATIVITY OF SIMULATNEITY


Up to now our considerations have been referred to a particular body
of reference, which we have styled a " railway embankment." We suppose
a very long train travelling along the rails with the constant
velocity v and in the direction indicated in Fig 1. People travelling
in this train will with a vantage view the train as a rigid
reference-body (co-ordinate system); they regard all events in

                       Fig. 01: file fig01.gif


reference to the train. Then every event which takes place along the
line also takes place at a particular point of the train. Also the
definition of simultaneity can be given relative to the train in
exactly the same way as with respect to the embankment. As a natural
consequence, however, the following question arises :

Are two events (e.g. the two strokes of lightning A and B) which are
simultaneous with reference to the railway embankment also
simultaneous relatively to the train? We shall show directly that the
answer must be in the negative.

When we say that the lightning strokes A and B are simultaneous with
respect to be embankment, we mean: the rays of light emitted at the
places A and B, where the lightning occurs, meet each other at the
mid-point M of the length A arrow B of the embankment. But the events
A and B also correspond to positions A and B on the train. Let M1 be
the mid-point of the distance A arrow B on the travelling train. Just
when the flashes (as judged from the embankment) of lightning occur,
this point M1 naturally coincides with the point M but it moves
towards the right in the diagram with the velocity v of the train. If
an observer sitting in the position M1 in the train did not possess
this velocity, then he would remain permanently at M, and the light
rays emitted by the flashes of lightning A and B would reach him
simultaneously, i.e. they would meet just where he is situated. Now in
reality (considered with reference to the railway embankment) he is
hastening towards the beam of light coming from B, whilst he is riding
on ahead of the beam of light coming from A. Hence the observer will
see the beam of light emitted from B earlier than he will see that
emitted from A. Observers who take the railway train as their
reference-body must therefore come to the conclusion that the
lightning flash B took place earlier than the lightning flash A. We
thus arrive at the important result:

Events which are simultaneous with reference to the embankment are not
simultaneous with respect to the train, and vice versa (relativity of
simultaneity). Every reference-body (co-ordinate system) has its own
particular time ; unless we are told the reference-body to which the
statement of time refers, there is no meaning in a statement of the
time of an event.

Now before the advent of the theory of relativity it had always
tacitly been assumed in physics that the statement of time had an
absolute significance, i.e. that it is independent of the state of
motion of the body of reference. But we have just seen that this
assumption is incompatible with the most natural definition of
simultaneity; if we discard this assumption, then the conflict between
the law of the propagation of light in vacuo and the principle of
relativity (developed in Section 7) disappears.

We were led to that conflict by the considerations of Section 6,
which are now no longer tenable. In that section we concluded that the
man in the carriage, who traverses the distance w per second relative
to the carriage, traverses the same distance also with respect to the
embankment in each second of time. But, according to the foregoing
considerations, the time required by a particular occurrence with
respect to the carriage must not be considered equal to the duration
of the same occurrence as judged from the embankment (as
reference-body). Hence it cannot be contended that the man in walking
travels the distance w relative to the railway line in a time which is
equal to one second as judged from the embankment.

Moreover, the considerations of Section 6 are based on yet a second
assumption, which, in the light of a strict consideration, appears to
be arbitrary, although it was always tacitly made even before the
introduction of the theory of relativity.



ON THE RELATIVITY OF THE CONCEPTION OF DISTANCE


Let us consider two particular points on the train * travelling

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It is true that this important law had hitherto been recorded in
mechanics, but it had not been interpreted. A satisfactory
interpretation can be obtained only if we recognise the following fact
: The same quality of a body manifests itself according to
circumstances as " inertia " or as " weight " (lit. " heaviness '). In
the following section we shall show to what extent this is actually
the case, and how this question is connected with the general
postulate of relativity.




THE EQUALITY OF INERTIAL AND GRAVITATIONAL MASS
AS AN ARGUMENT FOR THE GENERAL POSTULE OF RELATIVITY


We imagine a large portion of empty space, so far removed from stars
and other appreciable masses, that we have before us approximately the
conditions required by the fundamental law of Galilei. It is then
possible to choose a Galileian reference-body for this part of space
(world), relative to which points at rest remain at rest and points in
motion continue permanently in uniform rectilinear motion. As
reference-body let us imagine a spacious chest resembling a room with
an observer inside who is equipped with apparatus. Gravitation
naturally does not exist for this observer. He must fasten himself
with strings to the floor, otherwise the slightest impact against the
floor will cause him to rise slowly towards the ceiling of the room.

To the middle of the lid of the chest is fixed externally a hook with
rope attached, and now a " being " (what kind of a being is immaterial
to us) begins pulling at this with a constant force. The chest
together with the observer then begin to move "upwards" with a
uniformly accelerated motion. In course of time their velocity will
reach unheard-of values -- provided that we are viewing all this from
another reference-body which is not being pulled with a rope.

But how does the man in the chest regard the Process ? The
acceleration of the chest will be transmitted to him by the reaction
of the floor of the chest. He must therefore take up this pressure by
means of his legs if he does not wish to be laid out full length on
the floor. He is then standing in the chest in exactly the same way as
anyone stands in a room of a home on our earth. If he releases a body
which he previously had in his land, the accelertion of the chest will
no longer be transmitted to this body, and for this reason the body
will approach the floor of the chest with an accelerated relative
motion. The observer will further convince himself that the
acceleration of the body towards the floor of the chest is always of
the same magnitude, whatever kind of body he may happen to use for the
experiment.

Relying on his knowledge of the gravitational field (as it was
discussed in the preceding section), the man in the chest will thus
come to the conclusion that he and the chest are in a gravitational
field which is constant with regard to time. Of course he will be
puzzled for a moment as to why the chest does not fall in this
gravitational field. just then, however, he discovers the hook in the
middle of the lid of the chest and the rope which is attached to it,
and he consequently comes to the conclusion that the chest is
suspended at rest in the gravitational field.

Ought we to smile at the man and say that he errs in his conclusion ?
I do not believe we ought to if we wish to remain consistent ; we must
rather admit that his mode of grasping the situation violates neither
reason nor known mechanical laws. Even though it is being accelerated
with respect to the "Galileian space" first considered, we can
nevertheless regard the chest as being at rest. We have thus good
grounds for extending the principle of relativity to include bodies of
reference which are accelerated with respect to each other, and as a
result we have gained a powerful argument for a generalised postulate
of relativity.

We must note carefully that the possibility of this mode of
interpretation rests on the fundamental property of the gravitational
field of giving all bodies the same acceleration, or, what comes to
the same thing, on the law of the equality of inertial and
gravitational mass. If this natural law did not exist, the man in the
accelerated chest would not be able to interpret the behaviour of the
bodies around him on the supposition of a gravitational field, and he
would not be justified on the grounds of experience in supposing his
reference-body to be " at rest."

Suppose that the man in the chest fixes a rope to the inner side of
the lid, and that he attaches a body to the free end of the rope. The
result of this will be to strech the rope so that it will hang "
vertically " downwards. If we ask for an opinion of the cause of
tension in the rope, the man in the chest will say: "The suspended
body experiences a downward force in the gravitational field, and this
is neutralised by the tension of the rope ; what determines the
magnitude of the tension of the rope is the gravitational mass of the
suspended body." On the other hand, an observer who is poised freely
in space will interpret the condition of things thus : " The rope must
perforce take part in the accelerated motion of the chest, and it
transmits this motion to the body attached to it. The tension of the
rope is just large enough to effect the acceleration of the body. That
which determines the magnitude of the tension of the rope is the
inertial mass of the body." Guided by this example, we see that our
extension of the principle of relativity implies the necessity of the
law of the equality of inertial and gravitational mass. Thus we have
obtained a physical interpretation of this law.

From our consideration of the accelerated chest we see that a general
theory of relativity must yield important results on the laws of
gravitation. In point of fact, the systematic pursuit of the general
idea of relativity has supplied the laws satisfied by the
gravitational field. Before proceeding farther, however, I must warn
the reader against a misconception suggested by these considerations.
A gravitational field exists for the man in the chest, despite the
fact that there was no such field for the co-ordinate system first
chosen. Now we might easily suppose that the existence of a
gravitational field is always only an apparent one. We might also
think that, regardless of the kind of gravitational field which may be
present, we could always choose another reference-body such that no
gravitational field exists with reference to it. This is by no means
true for all gravitational fields, but only for those of quite special
form. It is, for instance, impossible to choose a body of reference
such that, as judged from it, the gravitational field of the earth (in
its entirety) vanishes.

We can now appreciate why that argument is not convincing, which we
brought forward against the general principle of relativity at theend
of Section 18. It is certainly true that the observer in the
railway carriage experiences a jerk forwards as a result of the
application of the brake, and that he recognises, in this the
non-uniformity of motion (retardation) of the carriage. But he is
compelled by nobody to refer this jerk to a " real " acceleration
(retardation) of the carriage. He might also interpret his experience
thus: " My body of reference (the carriage) remains permanently at
rest. With reference to it, however, there exists (during the period
of application of the brakes) a gravitational field which is directed
forwards and which is variable with respect to time. Under the
influence of this field, the embankment together with the earth moves
non-uniformly in such a manner that their original velocity in the
backwards direction is continuously reduced."



IN WHAT RESPECTS ARE THE FOUNDATIONS OF CLASSICAL MECHANICS AND OF THE
SPECIAL THEORY OF RELATIVITY UNSATISFACTORY?


We have already stated several times that classical mechanics starts
out from the following law: Material particles sufficiently far
removed from other material particles continue to move uniformly in a
straight line or continue in a state of rest. We have also repeatedly
emphasised that this fundamental law can only be valid for bodies of
reference K which possess certain unique states of motion, and which
are in uniform translational motion relative to each other. Relative
to other reference-bodies K the law is not valid. Both in classical
mechanics and in the special theory of relativity we therefore
differentiate between reference-bodies K relative to which the
recognised " laws of nature " can be said to hold, and
reference-bodies K relative to which these laws do not hold.

But no person whose mode of thought is logical can rest satisfied with
this condition of things. He asks : " How does it come that certain
reference-bodies (or their states of motion) are given priority over
other reference-bodies (or their states of motion) ? What is the
reason for this Preference? In order to show clearly what I mean by
this question, I shall make use of a comparison.

I am standing in front of a gas range. Standing alongside of each
other on the range are two pans so much alike that one may be mistaken
for the other. Both are half full of water. I notice that steam is
being emitted continuously from the one pan, but not from the other. I
am surprised at this, even if I have never seen either a gas range or
a pan before. But if I now notice a luminous something of bluish
colour under the first pan but not under the other, I cease to be
astonished, even if I have never before seen a gas flame. For I can
only say that this bluish something will cause the emission of the
steam, or at least possibly it may do so. If, however, I notice the
bluish something in neither case, and if I observe that the one
continuously emits steam whilst the other does not, then I shall
remain astonished and dissatisfied until I have discovered some
circumstance to which I can attribute the different behaviour of the
two pans.

Analogously, I seek in vain for a real something in classical
mechanics (or in the special theory of relativity) to which I can
attribute the different behaviour of bodies considered with respect to
the reference systems K and K1.*  Newton saw this objection and
attempted to invalidate it, but without success. But E. Mach recognsed
it most clearly of all, and because of this objection he claimed that
mechanics must be placed on a new basis. It can only be got rid of by
means of a physics which is conformable to the general principle of
relativity, since the equations of such a theory hold for every body
of reference, whatever may be its state of motion.


  Notes

*) The objection is of importance more especially when the state of
motion of the reference-body is of such a nature that it does not
require any external agency for its maintenance, e.g. in the case when
the reference-body is rotating uniformly.



A FEW INFERENCES FROM THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF RELATIVITY


The considerations of Section 20 show that the general principle of
relativity puts us in a position to derive properties of the
gravitational field in a purely theoretical manner. Let us suppose,
for instance, that we know the space-time " course " for any natural
process whatsoever, as regards the manner in which it takes place in
the Galileian domain relative to a Galileian body of reference K. By
means of purely theoretical operations (i.e. simply by calculation) we
are then able to find how this known natural process appears, as seen
from a reference-body K1 which is accelerated relatively to K. But
since a gravitational field exists with respect to this new body of
reference K1, our consideration also teaches us how the gravitational
field influences the process studied.

For example, we learn that a body which is in a state of uniform
rectilinear motion with respect to K (in accordance with the law of
Galilei) is executing an accelerated and in general curvilinear motion
with respect to the accelerated reference-body K1 (chest). This
acceleration or curvature corresponds to the influence on the moving
body of the gravitational field prevailing relatively to K. It is
known that a gravitational field influences the movement of bodies in
this way, so that our consideration supplies us with nothing
essentially new.

However, we obtain a new result of fundamental importance when we
carry out the analogous consideration for a ray of light. With respect
to the Galileian reference-body K, such a ray of light is transmitted
rectilinearly with the velocity c. It can easily be shown that the
path of the same ray of light is no longer a straight line when we
consider it with reference to the accelerated chest (reference-body

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Moreover, at this stage the definition of the space co-ordinates also
presents insurmountable difficulties. If the observer applies his
standard measuring-rod (a rod which is short as compared with the
radius of the disc) tangentially to the edge of the disc, then, as
judged from the Galileian system, the length of this rod will be less
than I, since, according to Section 12, moving bodies suffer a
shortening in the direction of the motion. On the other hand, the
measaring-rod will not experience a shortening in length, as judged
from K, if it is applied to the disc in the direction of the radius.
If, then, the observer first measures the circumference of the disc
with his measuring-rod and then the diameter of the disc, on dividing
the one by the other, he will not obtain as quotient the familiar
number p = 3.14 . . ., but a larger number,[4]** whereas of course,
for a disc which is at rest with respect to K, this operation would
yield p exactly. This proves that the propositions of Euclidean
geometry cannot hold exactly on the rotating disc, nor in general in a
gravitational field, at least if we attribute the length I to the rod
in all positions and in every orientation. Hence the idea of a
straight line also loses its meaning. We are therefore not in a
position to define exactly the co-ordinates x, y, z relative to the
disc by means of the method used in discussing the special theory, and
as long as the co- ordinates and times of events have not been
defined, we cannot assign an exact meaning to the natural laws in
which these occur.

Thus all our previous conclusions based on general relativity would
appear to be called in question. In reality we must make a subtle
detour in order to be able to apply the postulate of general
relativity exactly. I shall prepare the reader for this in the
following paragraphs.


  Notes

*) The field disappears at the centre of the disc and increases
proportionally to the distance from the centre as we proceed outwards.

**) Throughout this consideration we have to use the Galileian
(non-rotating) system K as reference-body, since we may only assume
the validity of the results of the special theory of relativity
relative to K (relative to K1 a gravitational field prevails).



EUCLIDEAN AND NON-EUCLIDEAN CONTINUUM


The surface of a marble table is spread out in front of me. I can get
from any one point on this table to any other point by passing
continuously from one point to a " neighbouring " one, and repeating
this process a (large) number of times, or, in other words, by going
from point to point without executing "jumps." I am sure the reader
will appreciate with sufficient clearness what I mean here by "
neighbouring " and by " jumps " (if he is not too pedantic). We
express this property of the surface by describing the latter as a
continuum.

Let us now imagine that a large number of little rods of equal length
have been made, their lengths being small compared with the dimensions
of the marble slab. When I say they are of equal length, I mean that
one can be laid on any other without the ends overlapping. We next lay
four of these little rods on the marble slab so that they constitute a
quadrilateral figure (a square), the diagonals of which are equally
long. To ensure the equality of the diagonals, we make use of a little
testing-rod. To this square we add similar ones, each of which has one
rod in common with the first. We proceed in like manner with each of
these squares until finally the whole marble slab is laid out with
squares. The arrangement is such, that each side of a square belongs
to two squares and each corner to four squares.

It is a veritable wonder that we can carry out this business without
getting into the greatest difficulties. We only need to think of the
following. If at any moment three squares meet at a corner, then two
sides of the fourth square are already laid, and, as a consequence,
the arrangement of the remaining two sides of the square is already
completely determined. But I am now no longer able to adjust the
quadrilateral so that its diagonals may be equal. If they are equal of
their own accord, then this is an especial favour of the marble slab
and of the little rods, about which I can only be thankfully
surprised. We must experience many such surprises if the construction
is to be successful.

If everything has really gone smoothly, then I say that the points of
the marble slab constitute a Euclidean continuum with respect to the
little rod, which has been used as a " distance " (line-interval). By
choosing one corner of a square as " origin" I can characterise every
other corner of a square with reference to this origin by means of two
numbers. I only need state how many rods I must pass over when,
starting from the origin, I proceed towards the " right " and then "
upwards," in order to arrive at the corner of the square under
consideration. These two numbers are then the " Cartesian co-ordinates
" of this corner with reference to the " Cartesian co-ordinate system"
which is determined by the arrangement of little rods.

By making use of the following modification of this abstract
experiment, we recognise that there must also be cases in which the
experiment would be unsuccessful. We shall suppose that the rods "
expand " by in amount proportional to the increase of temperature. We
heat the central part of the marble slab, but not the periphery, in
which case two of our little rods can still be brought into
coincidence at every position on the table. But our construction of
squares must necessarily come into disorder during the heating,
because the little rods on the central region of the table expand,
whereas those on the outer part do not.

With reference to our little rods -- defined as unit lengths -- the
marble slab is no longer a Euclidean continuum, and we are also no
longer in the position of defining Cartesian co-ordinates directly
with their aid, since the above construction can no longer be carried
out. But since there are other things which are not influenced in a
similar manner to the little rods (or perhaps not at all) by the
temperature of the table, it is possible quite naturally to maintain
the point of view that the marble slab is a " Euclidean continuum."
This can be done in a satisfactory manner by making a more subtle
stipulation about the measurement or the comparison of lengths.

But if rods of every kind (i.e. of every material) were to behave in
the same way as regards the influence of temperature when they are on
the variably heated marble slab, and if we had no other means of
detecting the effect of temperature than the geometrical behaviour of
our rods in experiments analogous to the one described above, then our
best plan would be to assign the distance one to two points on the
slab, provided that the ends of one of our rods could be made to
coincide with these two points ; for how else should we define the
distance without our proceeding being in the highest measure grossly
arbitrary ? The method of Cartesian coordinates must then be
discarded, and replaced by another which does not assume the validity
of Euclidean geometry for rigid bodies.*  The reader will notice
that the situation depicted here corresponds to the one brought about
by the general postitlate of relativity (Section 23).


  Notes

*) Mathematicians have been confronted with our problem in the
following form. If we are given a surface (e.g. an ellipsoid) in
Euclidean three-dimensional space, then there exists for this surface
a two-dimensional geometry, just as much as for a plane surface. Gauss
undertook the task of treating this two-dimensional geometry from
first principles, without making use of the fact that the surface
belongs to a Euclidean continuum of three dimensions. If we imagine
constructions to be made with rigid rods in the surface (similar to
that above with the marble slab), we should find that different laws

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perpetually passing out into infinite space, never to return, and
without ever again coming into interaction with other objects of
nature. Such a finite material universe would be destined to become
gradually but systematically impoverished.

In order to escape this dilemma, Seeliger suggested a modification of
Newton's law, in which he assumes that for great distances the force
of attraction between two masses diminishes more rapidly than would
result from the inverse square law. In this way it is possible for the
mean density of matter to be constant everywhere, even to infinity,
without infinitely large gravitational fields being produced. We thus
free ourselves from the distasteful conception that the material
universe ought to possess something of the nature of a centre. Of
course we purchase our emancipation from the fundamental difficulties
mentioned, at the cost of a modification and complication of Newton's
law which has neither empirical nor theoretical foundation. We can
imagine innumerable laws which would serve the same purpose, without
our being able to state a reason why one of them is to be preferred to
the others ; for any one of these laws would be founded just as little
on more general theoretical principles as is the law of Newton.


  Notes

*) Proof -- According to the theory of Newton, the number of "lines
of force" which come from infinity and terminate in a mass m is
proportional to the mass m. If, on the average, the Mass density p[0]
is constant throughout tithe universe, then a sphere of volume V will
enclose the average man p[0]V. Thus the number of lines of force
passing through the surface F of the sphere into its interior is
proportional to p[0] V. For unit area of the surface of the sphere the
number of lines of force which enters the sphere is thus proportional
to p[0] V/F or to p[0]R. Hence the intensity of the field at the
surface would ultimately become infinite with increasing radius R of
the sphere, which is impossible.



THE POSSIBILITY OF A "FINITE" AND YET "UNBOUNDED" UNIVERSE


But speculations on the structure of the universe also move in quite
another direction. The development of non-Euclidean geometry led to
the recognition of the fact, that we can cast doubt on the
infiniteness of our space without coming into conflict with the laws
of thought or with experience (Riemann, Helmholtz). These questions
have already been treated in detail and with unsurpassable lucidity by
Helmholtz and Poincaré, whereas I can only touch on them briefly here.

In the first place, we imagine an existence in two dimensional space.
Flat beings with flat implements, and in particular flat rigid
measuring-rods, are free to move in a plane. For them nothing exists
outside of this plane: that which they observe to happen to themselves
and to their flat " things " is the all-inclusive reality of their
plane. In particular, the constructions of plane Euclidean geometry
can be carried out by means of the rods e.g. the lattice construction,
considered in Section 24. In contrast to ours, the universe of
these beings is two-dimensional; but, like ours, it extends to
infinity. In their universe there is room for an infinite number of
identical squares made up of rods, i.e. its volume (surface) is
infinite. If these beings say their universe is " plane," there is
sense in the statement, because they mean that they can perform the
constructions of plane Euclidean geometry with their rods. In this
connection the individual rods always represent the same distance,
independently of their position.

Let us consider now a second two-dimensional existence, but this time
on a spherical surface instead of on a plane. The flat beings with
their measuring-rods and other objects fit exactly on this surface and
they are unable to leave it. Their whole universe of observation
extends exclusively over the surface of the sphere. Are these beings
able to regard the geometry of their universe as being plane geometry
and their rods withal as the realisation of " distance " ? They cannot
do this. For if they attempt to realise a straight line, they will
obtain a curve, which we " three-dimensional beings " designate as a
great circle, i.e. a self-contained line of definite finite length,
which can be measured up by means of a measuring-rod. Similarly, this
universe has a finite area that can be compared with the area, of a
square constructed with rods. The great charm resulting from this
consideration lies in the recognition of the fact that the universe of
these beings is finite and yet has no limits.

But the spherical-surface beings do not need to go on a world-tour in
order to perceive that they are not living in a Euclidean universe.
They can convince themselves of this on every part of their " world,"
provided they do not use too small a piece of it. Starting from a
point, they draw " straight lines " (arcs of circles as judged in
three dimensional space) of equal length in all directions. They will
call the line joining the free ends of these lines a " circle." For a
plane surface, the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its
diameter, both lengths being measured with the same rod, is, according
to Euclidean geometry of the plane, equal to a constant value p, which
is independent of the diameter of the circle. On their spherical
surface our flat beings would find for this ratio the value

                        eq. 27: file eq27.gif

i.e. a smaller value than p, the difference being the more
considerable, the greater is the radius of the circle in comparison
with the radius R of the " world-sphere." By means of this relation
the spherical beings can determine the radius of their universe ("
world "), even when only a relatively small part of their worldsphere
is available for their measurements. But if this part is very small
indeed, they will no longer be able to demonstrate that they are on a
spherical " world " and not on a Euclidean plane, for a small part of
a spherical surface differs only slightly from a piece of a plane of
the same size.

Thus if the spherical surface beings are living on a planet of which
the solar system occupies only a negligibly small part of the
spherical universe, they have no means of determining whether they are
living in a finite or in an infinite universe, because the " piece of
universe " to which they have access is in both cases practically
plane, or Euclidean. It follows directly from this discussion, that
for our sphere-beings the circumference of a circle first increases
with the radius until the " circumference of the universe " is
reached, and that it thenceforward gradually decreases to zero for
still further increasing values of the radius. During this process the
area of the circle continues to increase more and more, until finally
it becomes equal to the total area of the whole " world-sphere."