Crypt-Bear
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src/rsa/rsa_i62_priv.c view on Meta::CPAN
* Convert size to 62-bit words.
*/
fwlen = (fwlen + 1) >> 1;
/*
* We need to fit at least 6 values in the stack buffer.
*/
if (6 * fwlen > TLEN) {
return 0;
}
/*
* Compute signature length (in bytes).
*/
xlen = (sk->n_bitlen + 7) >> 3;
/*
* Decode q.
*/
mq = (uint32_t *)tmp;
br_i31_decode(mq, q, qlen);
/*
* Decode p.
*/
t1 = (uint32_t *)(tmp + fwlen);
br_i31_decode(t1, p, plen);
/*
* Compute the modulus (product of the two factors), to compare
* it with the source value. We use br_i31_mulacc(), since it's
* already used later on.
*/
t2 = (uint32_t *)(tmp + 2 * fwlen);
br_i31_zero(t2, mq[0]);
br_i31_mulacc(t2, mq, t1);
/*
* We encode the modulus into bytes, to perform the comparison
* with bytes. We know that the product length, in bytes, is
* exactly xlen.
* The comparison actually computes the carry when subtracting
* the modulus from the source value; that carry must be 1 for
* a value in the correct range. We keep it in r, which is our
* accumulator for the error code.
*/
t3 = (uint32_t *)(tmp + 4 * fwlen);
br_i31_encode(t3, xlen, t2);
u = xlen;
r = 0;
while (u > 0) {
uint32_t wn, wx;
u --;
wn = ((unsigned char *)t3)[u];
wx = x[u];
r = ((wx - (wn + r)) >> 8) & 1;
}
/*
* Move the decoded p to another temporary buffer.
*/
mp = (uint32_t *)(tmp + 2 * fwlen);
memmove(mp, t1, 2 * fwlen * sizeof *t1);
/*
* Compute s2 = x^dq mod q.
*/
q0i = br_i31_ninv31(mq[1]);
s2 = (uint32_t *)(tmp + fwlen);
br_i31_decode_reduce(s2, x, xlen, mq);
r &= br_i62_modpow_opt(s2, sk->dq, sk->dqlen, mq, q0i,
tmp + 3 * fwlen, TLEN - 3 * fwlen);
/*
* Compute s1 = x^dp mod p.
*/
p0i = br_i31_ninv31(mp[1]);
s1 = (uint32_t *)(tmp + 3 * fwlen);
br_i31_decode_reduce(s1, x, xlen, mp);
r &= br_i62_modpow_opt(s1, sk->dp, sk->dplen, mp, p0i,
tmp + 4 * fwlen, TLEN - 4 * fwlen);
/*
* Compute:
* h = (s1 - s2)*(1/q) mod p
* s1 is an integer modulo p, but s2 is modulo q. PKCS#1 is
* unclear about whether p may be lower than q (some existing,
* widely deployed implementations of RSA don't tolerate p < q),
* but we want to support that occurrence, so we need to use the
* reduction function.
*
* Since we use br_i31_decode_reduce() for iq (purportedly, the
* inverse of q modulo p), we also tolerate improperly large
* values for this parameter.
*/
t1 = (uint32_t *)(tmp + 4 * fwlen);
t2 = (uint32_t *)(tmp + 5 * fwlen);
br_i31_reduce(t2, s2, mp);
br_i31_add(s1, mp, br_i31_sub(s1, t2, 1));
br_i31_to_monty(s1, mp);
br_i31_decode_reduce(t1, sk->iq, sk->iqlen, mp);
br_i31_montymul(t2, s1, t1, mp, p0i);
/*
* h is now in t2. We compute the final result:
* s = s2 + q*h
* All these operations are non-modular.
*
* We need mq, s2 and t2. We use the t3 buffer as destination.
* The buffers mp, s1 and t1 are no longer needed, so we can
* reuse them for t3. Moreover, the first step of the computation
* is to copy s2 into t3, after which s2 is not needed. Right
* now, mq is in slot 0, s2 is in slot 1, and t2 is in slot 5.
* Therefore, we have ample room for t3 by simply using s2.
*/
t3 = s2;
br_i31_mulacc(t3, mq, t2);
/*
* Encode the result. Since we already checked the value of xlen,
( run in 2.204 seconds using v1.01-cache-2.11-cpan-39bf76dae61 )