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Republican Guard, the military key to the country, to turn against Saddam
and topple him on its own. But the chain of events leading inexorably to a
full-scale American invasion, if it hasn't already begun, evidently will
begin soon.

Lewis (Scooter) Libby, who was the principal drafter of Cheney's
future-of-the-world documents during the first Bush Administration, now
works in an office in the Old Executive Office Building, overlooking the
West Wing, where he has a second, smaller office. A packet of
public-relations material prompted by the recent paperback publication of
his 1996 novel, "The Apprentice," quotes the Times' calling him "Dick
Cheney's Dick Cheney," which seems like an apt description: he appears
absolutely sure of himself, and, whether by coincidence or as a result of
the influence of his boss, speaks in a tough, confidential, gravelly
rumble. Like Condoleezza Rice and Bush himself, he gives the impression of
having calmly accepted the idea that the project of war and reconstruction
which the Administration has now taken on may be a little exhausting for
those charged with carrying it out but is unquestionably right, the only
truly prudent course.

When I went to see Libby, not long ago, I asked him whether, before
September 11th, American policy toward terrorism should have been
different. He went to his desk and got out a large black loose-leaf binder,
filled with typewritten sheets interspersed with foldout maps of the Middle
East. He looked through it for a long minute, formulating his answer.

"Let us stack it up," he said at last. "Somalia, 1993; 1994, the discovery
of the Al Qaeda-related plot in the Philippines; 1993, the World Trade
Center, first bombing; 1993, the attempt to assassinate President Bush,
former President Bush, and the lack of response to that, the lack of a
serious response to that; 1995, the Riyadh bombing; 1996, the Khobar
bombing; 1998, the Kenyan embassy bombing and the Tanzanian embassy
bombing; 1999, the plot to launch millennium attacks; 2000, the bombing of
the Cole. Throughout this period, infractions on inspections by the Iraqis,
and eventually the withdrawal of the entire inspection regime; and the
failure to respond significantly to Iraqi incursions in the Kurdish areas.
No one would say these challenges posed easy problems, but if you take that
long list and you ask, 'Did we respond in a way which discouraged people
from supporting terrorist activities, or activities clearly against our
interests? Did we help to shape the environment in a way which discouraged
further aggressions against U.S. interests?,' many observers conclude no,
and ask whether it was then easier for someone like Osama bin Laden to rise
up and say credibly, 'The Americans don't have the stomach to defend
themselves. They won't take casualties to defend their interests. They are
morally weak.' "

Libby insisted that the American response to September 11th has not been
standard or foreordained. "Look at what the President has done in
Afghanistan," he said, "and look at his speech to the joint session of
Congress"-meaning the State of the Union Message, in January. "He made it
clear that it's an important area. He made it clear that we believe in
expanding the zone of democracy even in this difficult part of the world.
He made it clear that we stand by our friends and defend our interests. And
he had the courage to identify those states which present a problem, and to
begin to build consensus for action that would need to be taken if there is
not a change of behavior on their part. Take the Afghan case, for example.
There are many other courses that the President could have taken. He could
have waited for juridical proof before we responded. He could have engaged
in long negotiations with the Taliban. He could have failed to seek a new
relationship with Pakistan, based on its past nuclear tests, or been so
afraid of weakening Pakistan that we didn't seek its help. This list could
go on to twice or three times the length I've mentioned so far. But,
instead, the President saw an opportunity to refashion relations while
standing up for our interests. The problem is complex, and we don't know
yet how it will end, but we have opened new prospects for relations not
only with Afghanistan, as important as it was as a threat, but with the
states of Central Asia, Pakistan, Russia, and, as it may develop, with the
states of Southwest Asia more generally."

We moved on to Iraq, and the question of what makes Saddam Hussein
unacceptable, in the Administration's eyes. "The issue is not inspections,"
Libby said. "The issue is the Iraqis' promise not to have weapons of mass
destruction, their promise to recognize the boundaries of Kuwait, their
promise not to threaten other countries, and other promises that they made
in '91, and a number of U.N. resolutions, including all the other problems
I listed. Whether it was wise or not-and that is the subject of debate-Iraq
was given a second chance to abide by international norms. It failed to
take that chance then, and annually for the next ten years."

"What's your level of confidence," I asked him, "that the current regime
will, in fact, change its behavior in a way that you will be satisfied by?"

He ran his hand over his face and then gave me a direct gaze and spoke
slowly and deliberately. "There is no basis in Iraq's past behavior to have
confidence in good-faith efforts on their part to change their behavior."

-- 
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah@ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'