Alien-libsecp256k1
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libsecp256k1/examples/ecdh.c view on Meta::CPAN
return 1;
}
/* If the secret key is zero or out of range (greater than secp256k1's
* order), we fail. Note that the probability of this occurring is negligible
* with a properly functioning random number generator. */
if (!secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, seckey1) || !secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, seckey2)) {
printf("Generated secret key is invalid. This indicates an issue with the random number generator.\n");
return 1;
}
/* Public key creation using a valid context with a verified secret key should never fail */
return_val = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey1, seckey1);
assert(return_val);
return_val = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey2, seckey2);
assert(return_val);
/* Serialize pubkey1 in a compressed form (33 bytes), should always return 1 */
len = sizeof(compressed_pubkey1);
return_val = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx, compressed_pubkey1, &len, &pubkey1, SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED);
assert(return_val);
/* Should be the same size as the size of the output, because we passed a 33 byte array. */
assert(len == sizeof(compressed_pubkey1));
/* Serialize pubkey2 in a compressed form (33 bytes) */
len = sizeof(compressed_pubkey2);
return_val = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx, compressed_pubkey2, &len, &pubkey2, SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED);
assert(return_val);
/* Should be the same size as the size of the output, because we passed a 33 byte array. */
assert(len == sizeof(compressed_pubkey2));
/*** Creating the shared secret ***/
/* Perform ECDH with seckey1 and pubkey2. Should never fail with a verified
* seckey and valid pubkey */
return_val = secp256k1_ecdh(ctx, shared_secret1, &pubkey2, seckey1, NULL, NULL);
assert(return_val);
/* Perform ECDH with seckey2 and pubkey1. Should never fail with a verified
* seckey and valid pubkey */
return_val = secp256k1_ecdh(ctx, shared_secret2, &pubkey1, seckey2, NULL, NULL);
assert(return_val);
/* Both parties should end up with the same shared secret */
return_val = memcmp(shared_secret1, shared_secret2, sizeof(shared_secret1));
assert(return_val == 0);
printf("Secret Key1: ");
print_hex(seckey1, sizeof(seckey1));
printf("Compressed Pubkey1: ");
print_hex(compressed_pubkey1, sizeof(compressed_pubkey1));
printf("\nSecret Key2: ");
print_hex(seckey2, sizeof(seckey2));
printf("Compressed Pubkey2: ");
print_hex(compressed_pubkey2, sizeof(compressed_pubkey2));
printf("\nShared Secret: ");
print_hex(shared_secret1, sizeof(shared_secret1));
/* This will clear everything from the context and free the memory */
secp256k1_context_destroy(ctx);
/* It's best practice to try to clear secrets from memory after using them.
* This is done because some bugs can allow an attacker to leak memory, for
* example through "out of bounds" array access (see Heartbleed), or the OS
* swapping them to disk. Hence, we overwrite the secret key buffer with zeros.
*
* Here we are preventing these writes from being optimized out, as any good compiler
* will remove any writes that aren't used. */
secure_erase(seckey1, sizeof(seckey1));
secure_erase(seckey2, sizeof(seckey2));
secure_erase(shared_secret1, sizeof(shared_secret1));
secure_erase(shared_secret2, sizeof(shared_secret2));
return 0;
}
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