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lib/App/CamelPKI/Model/CA.pm  view on Meta::CPAN

=over

=item I<db_dir>

The directory where the AC database and its cryptographic
material (certificates and keys) are to be installed.

=item I<keysize>

The size of keys used for the Key Ceremony.

=back

=cut


=head1 METHODS

=head2 new

Constuctor of the singleton called by Catalyst. Overloaded to use
L<App::CamelPKI::RestrictedClassMethod>, so that it cannot be called from
anywere, except from the application's initialization sequence.

=cut

sub new : Restricted { shift->SUPER::new(@_) }

=head2 set_brands($ca_brand, $cadb_brand)

Conveys authority to create instances of L<App::CamelPKI::CA> and
L<App::CamelPKI::CADB> to this class when the restricted class method
discipline is enabled (see L<App::CamelPKI::RestrictedClassMethod>). Called
by L<App::CamelPKI/setup> after restricting all the constructors in the
application .  $ca_brand and $cadb_brand are the respective brands for
classes B<App::CamelPKI::CA> and B<App::CamelPKI::CADB>, as created by
L<App::CamelPKI::RestrictedClassMethod/grab>.

This class method is in turn restricted, so that only the application
initialization code may call it.  By default (eg in tests),
B<App::CamelPKI::Model::CA> uses fake brands (see
L<App::CamelPKI::RestrictedClassMethod/fake_grab>).

=cut

{
    my ($cabrand, $cadbbrand) =
        map { App::CamelPKI::RestrictedClassMethod->fake_grab($_) }
            qw(App::CamelPKI::CA App::CamelPKI::CADB);
    sub set_brands : Restricted {
        (undef, $cabrand, $cadbbrand) = @_;
    }

    sub _invoke_on_CA   { $cabrand->invoke(@_) }
    sub _invoke_on_CADB { $cadbbrand->invoke(@_) }
}

=head2 instance

Verify this CA has already undergone its Key Ceremony, or else throw an
exception; then create and returns an App::CamelPKI::CA instance which has
all privileges and represents the (unique) Operational CA installed on
this host.

Note that I<instance> is B<not> idempotent, and returns different
instances at each invocation. Were it not the case, constructors could
construct a covert channel using the shared instance, which is
mutable, and so a malicious controller could hide some information for
constructors that will later run in the same UNIX process.

=cut

sub instance {
    my ($self) = @_;
    my $ca = $self->_make_ca;
    unless ($ca->is_operational) {
        throw App::CamelPKI::Error::State(<<"MESSAGE");
The AC is not operational, please run
script/camel_pki_keyceremony.pl
MESSAGE
    }
    return $ca;
}

=head2 db_dir()

Returns the directory where are stored the App-PKI Certificate
Authority informations (certification chain, certificate, private
keys and AC database).

=cut

sub db_dir { shift->{db_dir} }

=head2 do_ceremony($privdir, $webserver)

Runs the B<Key Ceremony> for the Camel-PKI Certificate Authority. The
Operational CA and Root CA certificates are recorded in the private
directory configured with the I<db_dir> key (see L</CONFIGURATION>).
The Root CA certificate and key, and the administrator credentials are
written into $privdir, under the respective names C<ca0.key>,
C<ca0.crt>, C<admin.key> and C<admin.pem>. Last but not least, the Web
server certificate and key are installed in $webserver, an
L<App::CamelPKI::SysV::Apache> instance.

=cut

sub do_ceremony {
    use File::Slurp;
    use File::Spec::Functions qw(catfile);
    use App::CamelPKI::CertTemplate::CA;
    use App::CamelPKI::CertTemplate::PKI;
    use Sys::Hostname ();

    my ($self, $privdir, $webserver) = @_;

    throw App::CamelPKI::Error::Internal("INCORRECT_ARGS")
        unless (-d $privdir);

    # REFACTORME: use a complete App::CamelPKI::CA instance for the
    # Root CA
    my $privKeyCA0 = App::CamelPKI::PrivateKey->genrsa($self->{keysize});
    write_file(catfile($privdir, "ca0.key"),
               $privKeyCA0->serialize(-format => "PEM"));
    $privKeyCA0 = $privKeyCA0->as_crypt_openssl_ca_privatekey;
    my $certCA0 = Crypt::OpenSSL::CA::X509->new
        ($privKeyCA0->get_public_key);
    App::CamelPKI::CertTemplate::CA0->prepare_self_signed_certificate
        ($certCA0);
    my $pemCA0 = $certCA0->sign($privKeyCA0,"sha256");
    write_file(catfile($privdir, "ca0.crt"), $pemCA0);
    write_file($self->_root_ca_cert_path, $pemCA0);

    my $privKeyCA1 = App::CamelPKI::PrivateKey->genrsa($self->{keysize});
    my $certCA1 = Crypt::OpenSSL::CA::X509->new
        ($privKeyCA1->as_crypt_openssl_ca_privatekey->get_public_key);
    App::CamelPKI::CertTemplate::CA1->prepare_certificate($certCA0, $certCA1);
    $certCA1->set_serial("0x2"); # RFC3280 § 4.1.2.2 forbids zero
    my $pemCA1 = $certCA1->sign($privKeyCA0, "sha256");

    my $CA0 = App::CamelPKI::Certificate->parse($pemCA0);
    my $CA1 = App::CamelPKI::Certificate->parse($pemCA1);

    my $ca = $self->_make_ca;
    
    $ca->set_keys (-certificate => $CA1, -key =>  $privKeyCA1);

    my $webserverkey = App::CamelPKI::PrivateKey->genrsa($self->{keysize});
    my $web_dns = exists($self->{dns_webserver}) ? 
    	 $self->{dns_webserver} : "undef";
    $ca->issue
        ("App::CamelPKI::CertTemplate::PKI1", $webserverkey->get_public_key,
         dns => $web_dns);
    my ($webservercert) = $ca->commit;
    $webserver->set_keys
        (-certificate => $webservercert,
         -key => $webserverkey,
         -certification_chain => [ $CA1, $CA0 ]);

    my ($admincert, $adminkey) = $self->make_admin_credentials;
    write_file(catfile($privdir, "admin.pem"), $admincert->serialize);
    write_file(catfile($privdir, "admin.key"), $adminkey->serialize);

    return $self;
}

=head2 make_admin_credentials

Regenerate an initial administrator certificate and private key, and
returns a pair ($cert, $key) which are respectively
L<App::CamelPKI::Certificate> and L<App::CamelPKI::PrivateKey> instances. Old
administrator certificates are revoked.

=cut

sub make_admin_credentials {
    my ($self) = @_;