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infix/src/jit/executor.c view on Meta::CPAN
} UNWIND_CODE;
typedef struct _UNWIND_INFO {
uint8_t Version : 3;
uint8_t Flags : 5;
uint8_t SizeOfPrologue;
uint8_t CountOfCodes;
uint8_t FrameRegister : 4;
uint8_t FrameOffset : 4;
UNWIND_CODE UnwindCode[1]; // Variable length array
} UNWIND_INFO;
// We reserve 512 bytes at the end of every JIT block for SEH metadata.
#define INFIX_SEH_METADATA_SIZE 256
#elif defined(INFIX_OS_WINDOWS) && defined(INFIX_ARCH_AARCH64)
#pragma pack(push, 1)
typedef struct _UNWIND_INFO_ARM64 {
uint32_t FunctionLength : 18;
uint32_t Version : 2;
uint32_t X : 1;
uint32_t E : 1;
uint32_t EpilogueCount : 5;
uint32_t CodeWords : 5;
} UNWIND_INFO_ARM64;
#pragma pack(pop)
#define INFIX_SEH_METADATA_SIZE 256
#else
#define INFIX_SEH_METADATA_SIZE 0
#endif
// macOS JIT Security Hardening Logic
#if defined(INFIX_OS_MACOS)
/**
* @internal
* @brief macOS-specific function pointers and types for checking JIT entitlements.
*
* @details To support hardened runtimes on Apple platforms (especially Apple Silicon),
* `infix` must use special APIs like `MAP_JIT` and `pthread_jit_write_protect_np`.
* However, these are only effective if the host application has been granted the
* `com.apple.security.cs.allow-jit` entitlement.
*
* This logic performs a runtime check for these APIs and the entitlement, gracefully
* falling back to the legacy (but less secure) `mprotect` method if they are not
* available. This provides maximum security for production apps while maintaining
* maximum convenience for developers who may not have codesigned their test executables.
*/
typedef const struct __CFString * CFStringRef;
typedef const void * CFTypeRef;
typedef struct __SecTask * SecTaskRef;
typedef struct __CFError * CFErrorRef;
#define kCFStringEncodingUTF8 0x08000100
// A struct to hold dynamically loaded function pointers from macOS frameworks.
static struct {
void (*CFRelease)(CFTypeRef);
bool (*CFBooleanGetValue)(CFTypeRef boolean);
CFStringRef (*CFStringCreateWithCString)(CFTypeRef allocator, const char * cStr, uint32_t encoding);
CFTypeRef kCFAllocatorDefault;
SecTaskRef (*SecTaskCreateFromSelf)(CFTypeRef allocator);
CFTypeRef (*SecTaskCopyValueForEntitlement)(SecTaskRef task, CFStringRef entitlement, CFErrorRef * error);
void (*pthread_jit_write_protect_np)(int enabled);
void (*sys_icache_invalidate)(void * start, size_t len);
} g_macos_apis;
/**
* @internal
* @brief One-time initialization to dynamically load macOS framework functions.
* @details Uses `dlopen` and `dlsym` to find the necessary CoreFoundation and Security
* framework functions at runtime. This avoids a hard link-time dependency,
* making the library more portable and resilient if these frameworks change.
*/
static void initialize_macos_apis(void) {
// We don't need to link against these frameworks, which makes building simpler.
void * cf = dlopen("/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework/CoreFoundation", RTLD_LAZY);
void * sec = dlopen("/System/Library/Frameworks/Security.framework/Security", RTLD_LAZY);
// Hardened Runtime helpers found in libSystem/libpthread
g_macos_apis.pthread_jit_write_protect_np = dlsym(RTLD_DEFAULT, "pthread_jit_write_protect_np");
g_macos_apis.sys_icache_invalidate = dlsym(RTLD_DEFAULT, "sys_icache_invalidate");
if (!cf || !sec) {
INFIX_DEBUG_PRINTF("Warning: Could not dlopen macOS frameworks. JIT security features will be degraded.");
if (cf)
dlclose(cf);
if (sec)
dlclose(sec);
return;
}
g_macos_apis.CFRelease = dlsym(cf, "CFRelease");
g_macos_apis.CFBooleanGetValue = dlsym(cf, "CFBooleanGetValue");
g_macos_apis.CFStringCreateWithCString = dlsym(cf, "CFStringCreateWithCString");
void ** pAlloc = (void **)dlsym(cf, "kCFAllocatorDefault");
if (pAlloc)
g_macos_apis.kCFAllocatorDefault = *pAlloc;
g_macos_apis.SecTaskCreateFromSelf = dlsym(sec, "SecTaskCreateFromSelf");
g_macos_apis.SecTaskCopyValueForEntitlement = dlsym(sec, "SecTaskCopyValueForEntitlement");
dlclose(cf);
dlclose(sec);
}
/**
* @internal
* @brief Checks if the current process has the `com.apple.security.cs.allow-jit` entitlement.
* @return `true` if the entitlement is present and set to true, `false` otherwise.
*/
static bool has_jit_entitlement(void) {
// Use pthread_once to ensure the dynamic loading happens exactly once, thread-safely.
static pthread_once_t init_once = PTHREAD_ONCE_INIT;
pthread_once(&init_once, initialize_macos_apis);
// Secure JIT path on macOS requires both the entitlement check and the toggle API.
if (!g_macos_apis.pthread_jit_write_protect_np)
return false;
if (!g_macos_apis.SecTaskCopyValueForEntitlement || !g_macos_apis.CFStringCreateWithCString)
return false;
bool result = false;
SecTaskRef task = g_macos_apis.SecTaskCreateFromSelf(g_macos_apis.kCFAllocatorDefault);
if (!task)
return false;
CFStringRef key = g_macos_apis.CFStringCreateWithCString(
g_macos_apis.kCFAllocatorDefault, "com.apple.security.cs.allow-jit", kCFStringEncodingUTF8);
CFTypeRef value = nullptr;
if (key) {
infix/src/jit/executor.c view on Meta::CPAN
munmap(exec.rw_ptr, size);
if (exec.rx_ptr != MAP_FAILED)
munmap(exec.rx_ptr, size);
close(exec.shm_fd);
_infix_set_system_error(INFIX_CATEGORY_ALLOCATION, INFIX_CODE_EXECUTABLE_MEMORY_FAILURE, err, "mmap failed");
return (infix_executable_t){.rx_ptr = nullptr, .rw_ptr = nullptr, .size = 0, .shm_fd = -1};
}
// The mmap mappings hold a reference to the shared memory object, so we don't
// need the FD anymore. Keeping it open consumes a file descriptor per trampoline,
// causing "shm_open failed" after ~1024 trampolines.
close(exec.shm_fd);
exec.shm_fd = -1;
#endif
exec.size = size;
INFIX_DEBUG_PRINTF("Allocated JIT memory. RW at %p, RX at %p", exec.rw_ptr, exec.rx_ptr);
return exec;
}
#if defined(INFIX_OS_WINDOWS)
/**
* @internal
* @brief The personality routine for safe trampolines on Windows.
*
* @details This function is called by the Windows unwinder when an exception
* occurs within a safe trampoline or its callees. It catches the exception,
* sets the `INFIX_CODE_NATIVE_EXCEPTION` error, and redirects execution to
* the trampoline's epilogue by modifying the instruction pointer in the
* current context record and continuing execution.
*/
static EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION _infix_seh_personality_routine(PEXCEPTION_RECORD ExceptionRecord,
void * EstablisherFrame,
c23_maybe_unused PCONTEXT ContextRecord,
void * DispatcherContext) {
PDISPATCHER_CONTEXT dc = (PDISPATCHER_CONTEXT)DispatcherContext;
// If we are already unwinding, don't do anything.
if (ExceptionRecord->ExceptionFlags & (EXCEPTION_UNWINDING | EXCEPTION_EXIT_UNWIND))
return ExceptionContinueSearch;
// Set the thread-local error.
_infix_set_error(INFIX_CATEGORY_ABI, INFIX_CODE_NATIVE_EXCEPTION, 0);
// Retrieve the target epilogue IP from our HandlerData.
// The HandlerData points to the 4-byte epilogue offset we stored in UNWIND_INFO.
uint32_t epilogue_offset = *(uint32_t *)dc->HandlerData;
void * target_ip = (void *)(dc->ImageBase + epilogue_offset);
// Perform a non-local unwind to the epilogue.
RtlUnwind(EstablisherFrame, target_ip, ExceptionRecord, nullptr);
return ExceptionContinueSearch; // Unreachable
}
#if defined(INFIX_ARCH_X64)
// Internal: Populates and registers SEH metadata for a Windows x64 JIT block.
static void _infix_register_seh_windows_x64(infix_executable_t * exec,
infix_executable_category_t category,
uint32_t prologue_size,
uint32_t epilogue_offset) {
// metadata_ptr starts after the machine code.
uint8_t * metadata_base = (uint8_t *)exec->rw_ptr + exec->size;
// RUNTIME_FUNCTION (PDATA) - Must be 4-byte aligned.
RUNTIME_FUNCTION * rf = (RUNTIME_FUNCTION *)_infix_align_up((size_t)metadata_base, 4);
// UNWIND_INFO (XDATA) - Follows PDATA.
UNWIND_INFO * ui = (UNWIND_INFO *)_infix_align_up((size_t)(rf + 1), 2);
ui->Version = 1;
ui->Flags = 0;
if (category == INFIX_EXECUTABLE_SAFE_FORWARD)
ui->Flags |= UNW_FLAG_EHANDLER;
ui->FrameRegister = 5; // RBP
ui->FrameOffset = 0;
ui->SizeOfPrologue = (uint8_t)prologue_size;
if (category == INFIX_EXECUTABLE_REVERSE) {
// Reverse Trampoline: push rbp, push rsi, push rdi, mov rbp, rsp, and rsp -mask, [sub rsp, alloc]
ui->CountOfCodes = 4;
ui->UnwindCode[0].CodeOffset = 6; // After mov rbp, rsp
ui->UnwindCode[0].UnwindOp = UWOP_SET_FPREG;
ui->UnwindCode[0].OpInfo = 0;
ui->UnwindCode[1].CodeOffset = 3; // After push rdi
ui->UnwindCode[1].UnwindOp = UWOP_PUSH_NONVOL;
ui->UnwindCode[1].OpInfo = 7; // RDI
ui->UnwindCode[2].CodeOffset = 2; // After push rsi
ui->UnwindCode[2].UnwindOp = UWOP_PUSH_NONVOL;
ui->UnwindCode[2].OpInfo = 6; // RSI
ui->UnwindCode[3].CodeOffset = 1; // After push rbp
ui->UnwindCode[3].UnwindOp = UWOP_PUSH_NONVOL;
ui->UnwindCode[3].OpInfo = 5; // RBP
}
else {
// Forward or Direct Trampoline: push rbp, push r12-r15, mov rbp, rsp, and rsp -16, [sub rsp, alloc]
ui->CountOfCodes = 6;
// Opcodes in reverse order:
ui->UnwindCode[0].CodeOffset = 12; // After mov rbp, rsp
ui->UnwindCode[0].UnwindOp = UWOP_SET_FPREG;
ui->UnwindCode[0].OpInfo = 0;
ui->UnwindCode[1].CodeOffset = 9; // After push r15
ui->UnwindCode[1].UnwindOp = UWOP_PUSH_NONVOL;
ui->UnwindCode[1].OpInfo = 15; // R15
ui->UnwindCode[2].CodeOffset = 7; // After push r14
ui->UnwindCode[2].UnwindOp = UWOP_PUSH_NONVOL;
ui->UnwindCode[2].OpInfo = 14; // R14
ui->UnwindCode[3].CodeOffset = 5; // After push r13
ui->UnwindCode[3].UnwindOp = UWOP_PUSH_NONVOL;
ui->UnwindCode[3].OpInfo = 13; // R13
ui->UnwindCode[4].CodeOffset = 3; // After push r12
ui->UnwindCode[4].UnwindOp = UWOP_PUSH_NONVOL;
ui->UnwindCode[4].OpInfo = 12; // R12
ui->UnwindCode[5].CodeOffset = 1; // After push rbp
infix/src/jit/executor.c view on Meta::CPAN
// are located at the end of the XDATA, which is 4-byte aligned.
handler_info_ptr[0] = rva_offset + (uint32_t)(stub - (uint8_t *)exec->rx_ptr);
handler_info_ptr[1] = epilogue_offset;
}
if (RtlAddFunctionTable(rf, 2, base_address)) {
exec->seh_registration = rf;
INFIX_DEBUG_PRINTF(
"Registered SEH PDATA at %p (XDATA at %p, Stub at %p) for JIT code at %p", rf, ui, stub, exec->rx_ptr);
}
else {
fprintf(stderr, "infix: RtlAddFunctionTable failed! GetLastError=%lu\n", GetLastError());
}
}
#endif
#endif
#if defined(INFIX_OS_LINUX) && defined(INFIX_ARCH_X64)
/**
* @internal
* @brief Registers DWARF unwind information for a JIT-compiled block on Linux x64.
* @details This allows the C++ exception unwinder to correctly walk through
* JIT-compiled frames. We manually construct a Common Information Entry (CIE)
* and a Frame Description Entry (FDE) that match the stack behavior
* of our trampolines (standard RBP-based frame).
*/
static void _infix_register_eh_frame_linux_x64(infix_executable_t * exec, infix_executable_category_t category) {
// Simplified .eh_frame layout: [ CIE | FDE | Terminator ]
const size_t cie_size = 32;
const size_t fde_size = 64;
const size_t total_size = cie_size + fde_size + 4; // +4 for null terminator
uint8_t * eh = infix_malloc(total_size);
if (!eh)
return;
infix_memset(eh, 0, total_size);
uint8_t * p = eh;
// CIE
*(uint32_t *)p = (uint32_t)(cie_size - 4);
p += 4;
*(uint32_t *)p = 0;
p += 4;
*p++ = 1; // version
*p++ = '\0'; // augmentation
*p++ = 1; // code align
*p++ = 0x78; // data align (-8)
*p++ = 16; // ret reg (rip)
// Initial state: CFA = rsp + 8, rip at CFA - 8
*p++ = 0x0c;
*p++ = 0x07;
*p++ = 0x08;
*p++ = 0x90;
*p++ = 0x01;
while ((size_t)(p - eh) < cie_size)
*p++ = 0;
// FDE
uint8_t * fde_start = eh + cie_size;
p = fde_start;
*(uint32_t *)p = (uint32_t)(fde_size - 4);
p += 4;
*(uint32_t *)p = (uint32_t)(p - eh);
p += 4; // back-offset
*(void **)p = exec->rx_ptr;
p += 8;
*(uint64_t *)p = (uint64_t)exec->size;
p += 8;
*p++ = 0; // aug data len
// Instructions:
if (category == INFIX_EXECUTABLE_REVERSE) {
// push rbp; mov rbp, rsp; push rsi; push rdi
*p++ = 0x41; // loc +1 (after push rbp)
*p++ = 0x0e;
*p++ = 16; // def_cfa_offset 16
*p++ = 0x86;
*p++ = 0x02; // offset rbp (6), 2
*p++ = 0x43; // loc +3 (after mov rbp, rsp)
*p++ = 0x0d;
*p++ = 0x06; // def_cfa_register rbp (6)
*p++ = 0x41; // loc +1 (after push rsi)
*p++ = 0x84;
*p++ = 0x03; // offset rsi (4), 3
*p++ = 0x41; // loc +1 (after push rdi)
*p++ = 0x85;
*p++ = 0x04; // offset rdi (5), 4
}
else {
// push rbp; mov rbp, rsp; push r12; push r13; push r14; push r15
*p++ = 0x41; // loc +1 (after push rbp)
*p++ = 0x0e;
*p++ = 16; // def_cfa_offset 16
*p++ = 0x86;
*p++ = 0x02; // offset rbp (6), 2
*p++ = 0x43; // loc +3 (after mov rbp, rsp)
*p++ = 0x0d;
*p++ = 0x06; // def_cfa_register rbp (6)
*p++ = 0x42; // loc +2 (after push r12)
*p++ = 0x8c;
*p++ = 0x03; // offset r12, 3
*p++ = 0x42; // loc +2 (after push r13)
*p++ = 0x8d;
*p++ = 0x04; // offset r13, 4
*p++ = 0x42; // loc +2 (after push r14)
*p++ = 0x8e;
*p++ = 0x05; // offset r14, 5
*p++ = 0x42; // loc +2 (after push r15)
*p++ = 0x8f;
*p++ = 0x06; // offset r15, 6
}
while ((size_t)(p - eh) < (cie_size + fde_size))
*p++ = 0;
*(uint32_t *)p = 0; // Terminator
extern void __register_frame(void *);
pthread_mutex_lock(&g_dwarf_mutex);
__register_frame(eh);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&g_dwarf_mutex);
exec->eh_frame_ptr = eh;
INFIX_DEBUG_PRINTF("Registered DWARF .eh_frame at %p for JIT code at %p", (void *)eh, exec->rx_ptr);
}
#elif defined(INFIX_OS_LINUX) && defined(INFIX_ARCH_AARCH64)
/**
* @internal
* @brief Registers DWARF unwind information for a JIT-compiled block on ARM64 Linux.
* @details This allows the C++ exception unwinder to correctly walk through
* JIT-compiled frames. We manually construct a Common Information Entry (CIE)
* and a Frame Description Entry (FDE) that match the stack behavior
* of our ARM64 trampolines.
*/
static void _infix_register_eh_frame_arm64(infix_executable_t * exec, infix_executable_category_t category) {
// Simplified .eh_frame layout: [ CIE | FDE | Terminator ]
const size_t cie_size = 32;
const size_t fde_size = 64;
const size_t total_size = cie_size + fde_size + 4; // +4 for null terminator
uint8_t * eh = infix_malloc(total_size);
if (!eh)
return;
infix_memset(eh, 0, total_size);
uint8_t * p = eh;
// CIE (Common Information Entry)
*(uint32_t *)p = (uint32_t)(cie_size - 4);
p += 4; // length
*(uint32_t *)p = 0;
p += 4; // cie_id (0)
*p++ = 1; // version
*p++ = '\0'; // augmentation string ("")
*p++ = 4; // code_alignment_factor (AArch64 instructions are 4 bytes)
*p++ = 0x78; // data_alignment_factor (-8 in SLEB128)
*p++ = 30; // return_address_register (30 = lr on arm64)
// CIE Instructions: Initial state
// DW_CFA_def_cfa sp, 0
*p++ = 0x0c;
*p++ = 31;
*p++ = 0;
while ((size_t)(p - eh) < cie_size)
*p++ = 0;
// FDE (Frame Description Entry)
uint8_t * fde_start = eh + cie_size;
p = fde_start;
*(uint32_t *)p = (uint32_t)(fde_size - 4);
p += 4; // length
*(uint32_t *)p = (uint32_t)(p - eh);
p += 4; // cie_pointer (back-offset)
*(void **)p = exec->rx_ptr;
p += 8; // pc_begin (absolute)
*(uint64_t *)p = (uint64_t)exec->size;
p += 8; // pc_range (absolute)
*p++ = 0; // aug data len
// Instructions: match our trampoline prologue
if (category == INFIX_EXECUTABLE_REVERSE) {
// stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]!; mov x29, sp
*p++ = 0x41; // loc +1 (4 bytes, after stp)
*p++ = 0x0e;
*p++ = 16; // def_cfa_offset 16
*p++ = 0x9d;
*p++ = 2; // offset r29 (x29), 2 (CFA - 16)
*p++ = 0x9e;
*p++ = 1; // offset r30 (x30/lr), 1 (CFA - 8)
*p++ = 0x41; // loc +1 (4 bytes, after mov)
*p++ = 0x0d;
*p++ = 29; // def_cfa_register r29
}
else {
// stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]!; stp x19, x20, ...; stp x21, x22, ...; mov x29, sp
*p++ = 0x41; // after stp x29, x30
*p++ = 0x0e;
*p++ = 16;
*p++ = 0x9d;
*p++ = 2; // x29 at CFA - 16
*p++ = 0x9e;
*p++ = 1; // x30 at CFA - 8
*p++ = 0x41; // after stp x19, x20
*p++ = 0x0e;
*p++ = 32;
*p++ = 0x93;
*p++ = 4; // x19 at CFA - 32
*p++ = 0x94;
*p++ = 3; // x20 at CFA - 24
*p++ = 0x41; // after stp x21, x22
*p++ = 0x0e;
*p++ = 48;
*p++ = 0x95;
*p++ = 6; // x21 at CFA - 48
*p++ = 0x96;
*p++ = 5; // x22 at CFA - 40
*p++ = 0x41; // after mov x29, sp
*p++ = 0x0d;
*p++ = 29; // def_cfa_register x29 (offset remains 48)
}
while ((size_t)(p - eh) < (cie_size + fde_size))
*p++ = 0;
*(uint32_t *)p = 0; // Terminator
// Register the frame with the runtime.
extern void __register_frame(void *);
pthread_mutex_lock(&g_dwarf_mutex);
infix/src/jit/executor.c view on Meta::CPAN
#else
// Dual-mapping POSIX: protect and unmap both views.
if (exec.eh_frame_ptr) {
extern void __deregister_frame(void *);
pthread_mutex_lock(&g_dwarf_mutex);
__deregister_frame(exec.eh_frame_ptr);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&g_dwarf_mutex);
infix_free(exec.eh_frame_ptr);
}
if (exec.rx_ptr)
mprotect(exec.rx_ptr, exec.size, PROT_NONE);
if (exec.rw_ptr)
munmap(exec.rw_ptr, exec.size);
if (exec.rx_ptr && exec.rx_ptr != exec.rw_ptr) // rw_ptr might be same as rx_ptr on some platforms
munmap(exec.rx_ptr, exec.size);
if (exec.shm_fd >= 0)
close(exec.shm_fd);
#endif
}
/**
* @internal
* @brief Makes a block of JIT memory executable and flushes instruction caches.
*
* @details This function completes the W^X process.
* - On single-mapping platforms, it changes the memory protection from RW to RX.
* - On dual-mapping platforms, this is a no-op as the RX mapping already exists.
*
* Crucially, it also handles flushing the CPU's instruction cache on architectures
* that require it (like AArch64). This is necessary because the CPU may have cached
* old (zeroed) data from the memory location, and it must be explicitly told to
* re-read the newly written machine code instructions.
*
* @param exec The executable memory block.
* @param category The category of the trampoline.
* @param prologue_size The size of the prologue.
* @return `true` on success, `false` on failure.
*/
c23_nodiscard bool infix_executable_make_executable(infix_executable_t * exec,
c23_maybe_unused infix_executable_category_t category,
c23_maybe_unused uint32_t prologue_size,
c23_maybe_unused uint32_t epilogue_offset) {
if (exec->rw_ptr == nullptr || exec->size == 0)
return false;
// On AArch64 (and other RISC architectures), the instruction and data caches can be
// separate. We must explicitly flush the D-cache (where the JIT wrote the code)
// and invalidate the I-cache so the CPU fetches the new instructions.
// We might as well do it on x64 too.
#if defined(INFIX_COMPILER_MSVC)
// Use the Windows-specific API.
FlushInstructionCache(GetCurrentProcess(), exec->rw_ptr, exec->size);
#elif defined(INFIX_OS_MACOS)
// Use the Apple-specific API if available (required for Apple Silicon correctness)
if (g_macos_apis.sys_icache_invalidate)
g_macos_apis.sys_icache_invalidate(exec->rw_ptr, exec->size);
else
__builtin___clear_cache((char *)exec->rw_ptr, (char *)exec->rw_ptr + exec->size);
#elif defined(INFIX_ARCH_AARCH64)
// Robust manual cache clearing for AArch64 Linux/BSD.
// We clean the D-cache to point of unification and invalidate the I-cache.
uintptr_t start = (uintptr_t)exec->rw_ptr;
uintptr_t end = start + exec->size;
uintptr_t ctr_el0;
__asm__ __volatile__("mrs %0, ctr_el0" : "=r"(ctr_el0));
// D-cache line size is in bits [19:16] as log2 of number of words.
uintptr_t d_line_size = 4 << ((ctr_el0 >> 16) & 0xf);
for (uintptr_t addr = start & ~(d_line_size - 1); addr < end; addr += d_line_size)
__asm__ __volatile__("dc cvau, %0" ::"r"(addr) : "memory");
__asm__ __volatile__("dsb ish" ::: "memory");
// I-cache line size is in bits [3:0] as log2 of number of words.
uintptr_t i_line_size = 4 << (ctr_el0 & 0xf);
for (uintptr_t addr = start & ~(i_line_size - 1); addr < end; addr += i_line_size)
__asm__ __volatile__("ic ivau, %0" ::"r"(addr) : "memory");
__asm__ __volatile__("dsb ish\n\tisb" ::: "memory");
#else
// Use the GCC/Clang built-in for other platforms.
__builtin___clear_cache((char *)exec->rw_ptr, (char *)exec->rw_ptr + exec->size);
#endif
bool result = false;
#if defined(INFIX_OS_WINDOWS)
// On Windows, we register SEH unwind info before making the memory executable.
#if defined(INFIX_ARCH_X64)
_infix_register_seh_windows_x64(exec, category, prologue_size, epilogue_offset);
#elif defined(INFIX_ARCH_AARCH64)
_infix_register_seh_windows_arm64(exec, category, prologue_size, epilogue_offset);
#endif
// Finalize permissions to Read+Execute.
// We include the SEH metadata in the protected region.
result = VirtualProtect(exec->rw_ptr, exec->size + INFIX_SEH_METADATA_SIZE, PAGE_EXECUTE_READ, &(DWORD){0});
if (!result)
_infix_set_system_error(INFIX_CATEGORY_ALLOCATION, INFIX_CODE_PROTECTION_FAILURE, GetLastError(), nullptr);
#elif defined(INFIX_OS_MACOS)
static bool g_use_secure_jit_path = false;
static bool g_checked_jit_support = false;
if (!g_checked_jit_support) {
g_use_secure_jit_path = has_jit_entitlement();
g_checked_jit_support = true;
}
if (g_use_secure_jit_path && g_macos_apis.pthread_jit_write_protect_np) {
// Switch thread state to Execute allowed (enabled=1)
g_macos_apis.pthread_jit_write_protect_np(1);
result = true;
}
else {
result = (mprotect(exec->rw_ptr, exec->size, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC) == 0);
}
if (!result)
_infix_set_system_error(INFIX_CATEGORY_ALLOCATION, INFIX_CODE_PROTECTION_FAILURE, errno, nullptr);
#elif defined(INFIX_OS_ANDROID) || defined(INFIX_OS_OPENBSD) || defined(INFIX_OS_DRAGONFLY)
// Other single-mapping POSIX platforms use mprotect.
result = (mprotect(exec->rw_ptr, exec->size, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC) == 0);
if (!result)
_infix_set_system_error(INFIX_CATEGORY_ALLOCATION, INFIX_CODE_PROTECTION_FAILURE, errno, nullptr);
#else
// Dual-mapping POSIX (Linux, FreeBSD).
// The RX mapping is already executable.
#if defined(INFIX_OS_LINUX) && defined(INFIX_ARCH_X64)
_infix_register_eh_frame_linux_x64(exec, category);
#elif defined(INFIX_OS_LINUX) && defined(INFIX_ARCH_AARCH64)
_infix_register_eh_frame_arm64(exec, category);
#endif
// SECURITY CRITICAL: We MUST unmap the RW view now. If we leave it mapped,
// an attacker with a heap disclosure could find it and overwrite the JIT code,
// bypassing W^X.
if (munmap(exec->rw_ptr, exec->size) == 0) {
exec->rw_ptr = nullptr; // Clear the pointer to prevent double-free or misuse.
result = true;
}
else {
_infix_set_system_error(
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