Affix
view release on metacpan or search on metacpan
infix/src/jit/executor.c view on Meta::CPAN
/**
* Copyright (c) 2025 Sanko Robinson
*
* This source code is dual-licensed under the Artistic License 2.0 or the MIT License.
* You may choose to use this code under the terms of either license.
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: (Artistic-2.0 OR MIT)
*
* The documentation blocks within this file are licensed under the
* Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0).
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: CC-BY-4.0
*/
/**
* @file executor.c
* @brief Implements platform-specific memory management for JIT code and execution.
* @ingroup internal_jit
*
* @details This module serves as the critical OS abstraction layer for the JIT engine.
* Its primary responsibilities are:
*
* 1. **Executable Memory Management:** It allocates, protects, and frees executable
* memory in a way that is secure and compliant with modern OS security features
* like **W^X (Write XOR Execute)**. It implements different strategies (single-
* vs. dual-mapping) depending on the platform's capabilities and security model.
*
* 2. **Security Hardening:** It provides mechanisms to make memory regions read-only,
* which is used to protect the `infix_reverse_t` context from runtime memory
* corruption. It also implements "guard pages" on freed memory to immediately
* catch use-after-free bugs.
*
* 3. **Universal Dispatch:** It contains the `infix_internal_dispatch_callback_fn_impl`,
* the universal C entry point that is the final target of all reverse trampoline
* stubs. This function is the bridge between the low-level JIT code and the
* high-level user-provided C handlers.
*/
#include "common/infix_internals.h"
#include "common/utility.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <time.h>
// Platform-Specific Includes
#if defined(INFIX_OS_WINDOWS)
#include <windows.h>
#else
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#endif
#if defined(INFIX_OS_MACOS)
#include <dlfcn.h>
#include <libkern/OSCacheControl.h>
#endif
// Polyfills for mmap flags for maximum POSIX compatibility.
#if defined(INFIX_ENV_POSIX) && !defined(INFIX_OS_WINDOWS)
#if !defined(MAP_ANON) && defined(MAP_ANONYMOUS)
#define MAP_ANON MAP_ANONYMOUS
#endif
static pthread_mutex_t g_dwarf_mutex = PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER;
#endif
#if defined(INFIX_OS_WINDOWS) && defined(INFIX_ARCH_X64)
// SEH Unwind Info Opcodes and Structures for JIT code on Windows x64.
// These are defined in winnt.h but we redefine them here for clarity and to ensure availability.
#define UWOP_PUSH_NONVOL 0
#define UWOP_ALLOC_LARGE 1
#define UWOP_ALLOC_SMALL 2
#define UWOP_SET_FPREG 3
#pragma pack(push, 1)
typedef struct _UNWIND_CODE {
uint8_t CodeOffset;
uint8_t UnwindOp : 4;
uint8_t OpInfo : 4;
} UNWIND_CODE;
typedef struct _UNWIND_INFO {
uint8_t Version : 3;
uint8_t Flags : 5;
uint8_t SizeOfPrologue;
uint8_t CountOfCodes;
uint8_t FrameRegister : 4;
uint8_t FrameOffset : 4;
UNWIND_CODE UnwindCode[1]; // Variable length array
} UNWIND_INFO;
// We reserve 512 bytes at the end of every JIT block for SEH metadata.
#define INFIX_SEH_METADATA_SIZE 256
#elif defined(INFIX_OS_WINDOWS) && defined(INFIX_ARCH_AARCH64)
#pragma pack(push, 1)
typedef struct _UNWIND_INFO_ARM64 {
uint32_t FunctionLength : 18;
uint32_t Version : 2;
uint32_t X : 1;
uint32_t E : 1;
uint32_t EpilogueCount : 5;
uint32_t CodeWords : 5;
} UNWIND_INFO_ARM64;
#pragma pack(pop)
#define INFIX_SEH_METADATA_SIZE 256
#else
#define INFIX_SEH_METADATA_SIZE 0
#endif
// macOS JIT Security Hardening Logic
#if defined(INFIX_OS_MACOS)
/**
* @internal
* @brief macOS-specific function pointers and types for checking JIT entitlements.
*
* @details To support hardened runtimes on Apple platforms (especially Apple Silicon),
* `infix` must use special APIs like `MAP_JIT` and `pthread_jit_write_protect_np`.
* However, these are only effective if the host application has been granted the
* `com.apple.security.cs.allow-jit` entitlement.
*
* This logic performs a runtime check for these APIs and the entitlement, gracefully
* falling back to the legacy (but less secure) `mprotect` method if they are not
* available. This provides maximum security for production apps while maintaining
* maximum convenience for developers who may not have codesigned their test executables.
*/
typedef const struct __CFString * CFStringRef;
typedef const void * CFTypeRef;
typedef struct __SecTask * SecTaskRef;
typedef struct __CFError * CFErrorRef;
#define kCFStringEncodingUTF8 0x08000100
// A struct to hold dynamically loaded function pointers from macOS frameworks.
static struct {
void (*CFRelease)(CFTypeRef);
bool (*CFBooleanGetValue)(CFTypeRef boolean);
CFStringRef (*CFStringCreateWithCString)(CFTypeRef allocator, const char * cStr, uint32_t encoding);
CFTypeRef kCFAllocatorDefault;
SecTaskRef (*SecTaskCreateFromSelf)(CFTypeRef allocator);
CFTypeRef (*SecTaskCopyValueForEntitlement)(SecTaskRef task, CFStringRef entitlement, CFErrorRef * error);
void (*pthread_jit_write_protect_np)(int enabled);
void (*sys_icache_invalidate)(void * start, size_t len);
} g_macos_apis;
/**
* @internal
* @brief One-time initialization to dynamically load macOS framework functions.
* @details Uses `dlopen` and `dlsym` to find the necessary CoreFoundation and Security
* framework functions at runtime. This avoids a hard link-time dependency,
* making the library more portable and resilient if these frameworks change.
*/
static void initialize_macos_apis(void) {
// We don't need to link against these frameworks, which makes building simpler.
void * cf = dlopen("/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework/CoreFoundation", RTLD_LAZY);
void * sec = dlopen("/System/Library/Frameworks/Security.framework/Security", RTLD_LAZY);
// Hardened Runtime helpers found in libSystem/libpthread
g_macos_apis.pthread_jit_write_protect_np = dlsym(RTLD_DEFAULT, "pthread_jit_write_protect_np");
g_macos_apis.sys_icache_invalidate = dlsym(RTLD_DEFAULT, "sys_icache_invalidate");
if (!cf || !sec) {
INFIX_DEBUG_PRINTF("Warning: Could not dlopen macOS frameworks. JIT security features will be degraded.");
if (cf)
dlclose(cf);
if (sec)
dlclose(sec);
return;
}
g_macos_apis.CFRelease = dlsym(cf, "CFRelease");
g_macos_apis.CFBooleanGetValue = dlsym(cf, "CFBooleanGetValue");
g_macos_apis.CFStringCreateWithCString = dlsym(cf, "CFStringCreateWithCString");
void ** pAlloc = (void **)dlsym(cf, "kCFAllocatorDefault");
if (pAlloc)
g_macos_apis.kCFAllocatorDefault = *pAlloc;
g_macos_apis.SecTaskCreateFromSelf = dlsym(sec, "SecTaskCreateFromSelf");
g_macos_apis.SecTaskCopyValueForEntitlement = dlsym(sec, "SecTaskCopyValueForEntitlement");
dlclose(cf);
dlclose(sec);
}
/**
* @internal
* @brief Checks if the current process has the `com.apple.security.cs.allow-jit` entitlement.
* @return `true` if the entitlement is present and set to true, `false` otherwise.
*/
static bool has_jit_entitlement(void) {
// Use pthread_once to ensure the dynamic loading happens exactly once, thread-safely.
static pthread_once_t init_once = PTHREAD_ONCE_INIT;
pthread_once(&init_once, initialize_macos_apis);
// Secure JIT path on macOS requires both the entitlement check and the toggle API.
if (!g_macos_apis.pthread_jit_write_protect_np)
return false;
if (!g_macos_apis.SecTaskCopyValueForEntitlement || !g_macos_apis.CFStringCreateWithCString)
return false;
bool result = false;
SecTaskRef task = g_macos_apis.SecTaskCreateFromSelf(g_macos_apis.kCFAllocatorDefault);
if (!task)
return false;
CFStringRef key = g_macos_apis.CFStringCreateWithCString(
g_macos_apis.kCFAllocatorDefault, "com.apple.security.cs.allow-jit", kCFStringEncodingUTF8);
CFTypeRef value = nullptr;
if (key) {
// This is the core check: ask the system for the value of the entitlement.
value = g_macos_apis.SecTaskCopyValueForEntitlement(task, key, nullptr);
g_macos_apis.CFRelease(key);
}
g_macos_apis.CFRelease(task);
if (value) {
// The value of the entitlement is a CFBoolean, so we must extract its value.
if (g_macos_apis.CFBooleanGetValue && g_macos_apis.CFBooleanGetValue(value))
result = true;
g_macos_apis.CFRelease(value);
}
return result;
}
#endif // INFIX_OS_MACOS
// Hardened POSIX Anonymous Shared Memory Allocator (for Dual-Mapping W^X)
#if !defined(INFIX_OS_WINDOWS) && !defined(INFIX_OS_MACOS) && !defined(INFIX_OS_ANDROID) && !defined(INFIX_OS_OPENBSD)
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#if defined(INFIX_OS_LINUX) && defined(_GNU_SOURCE)
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#endif
/**
* @internal
* @brief Creates an anonymous file descriptor suitable for dual-mapping.
*
* @details Attempts multiple strategies in order of preference:
* 1. `memfd_create`: Modern Linux (kernel 3.17+). Best for security (no filesystem path).
* 2. `shm_open(SHM_ANON)`: FreeBSD/DragonFly. Automatic anonymity.
* 3. `shm_open(random_name)`: Fallback for older Linux/POSIX. Manually unlinked immediately.
*/
static int create_anonymous_file(void) {
#if defined(INFIX_OS_LINUX) && defined(MFD_CLOEXEC)
// Strategy 1: memfd_create (Linux 3.17+)
// MFD_CLOEXEC ensures the FD isn't leaked to child processes.
int linux_fd = memfd_create("infix_jit", MFD_CLOEXEC);
if (linux_fd >= 0)
return linux_fd;
// If it fails (e.g. old kernel, ENOSYS), fall through to shm_open.
#endif
#if defined(__FreeBSD__) && defined(SHM_ANON)
// Strategy 2: SHM_ANON (FreeBSD)
int bsd_fd = shm_open(SHM_ANON, O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_EXCL, 0600);
if (bsd_fd >= 0)
return bsd_fd;
#endif
// Strategy 3: shm_open with randomized name (Legacy POSIX)
char shm_name[64];
uint64_t random_val = 0;
// Generate a sufficiently random name to avoid collisions if multiple processes
// are running this code simultaneously. Using /dev/urandom is a robust way to do this.
int rand_fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
if (rand_fd < 0)
return -1;
ssize_t bytes_read = read(rand_fd, &random_val, sizeof(random_val));
close(rand_fd);
if (bytes_read != sizeof(random_val))
return -1;
snprintf(shm_name, sizeof(shm_name), "/infix-jit-%d-%llx", getpid(), (unsigned long long)random_val);
// Create the shared memory object exclusively.
int fd = shm_open(shm_name, O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_EXCL, 0600);
if (fd >= 0) {
// Unlink immediately. The name is removed, but the inode persists until close().
shm_unlink(shm_name);
return fd;
}
return -1;
}
#endif
// Public API: Executable Memory Management
/**
* @internal
* @brief Allocates a block of memory suitable for holding JIT-compiled code,
* respecting platform-specific W^X (Write XOR Execute) security policies.
* @param size The number of bytes to allocate. Must be a multiple of the system page size.
* @return An `infix_executable_t` structure. On failure, its pointers will be `nullptr`.
*/
c23_nodiscard infix_executable_t infix_executable_alloc(size_t size) {
#if defined(INFIX_OS_WINDOWS)
infix_executable_t exec = {
.rx_ptr = nullptr, .rw_ptr = nullptr, .size = 0, .handle = nullptr, .seh_registration = nullptr};
#else
infix_executable_t exec = {.rx_ptr = nullptr, .rw_ptr = nullptr, .size = 0, .shm_fd = -1, .eh_frame_ptr = nullptr};
#endif
if (size == 0)
return exec;
#if defined(INFIX_OS_WINDOWS)
// Add headroom for SEH metadata on Windows.
size_t total_size = size + INFIX_SEH_METADATA_SIZE;
// Windows: Single-mapping W^X. Allocate as RW, later change to RX via VirtualProtect.
void * code = VirtualAlloc(nullptr, total_size, MEM_COMMIT | MEM_RESERVE, PAGE_READWRITE);
if (code == nullptr) {
_infix_set_system_error(
INFIX_CATEGORY_ALLOCATION, INFIX_CODE_EXECUTABLE_MEMORY_FAILURE, GetLastError(), nullptr);
return exec;
}
exec.rw_ptr = code;
exec.rx_ptr = code;
#elif defined(INFIX_OS_MACOS) || defined(INFIX_OS_ANDROID) || defined(INFIX_OS_OPENBSD) || defined(INFIX_OS_DRAGONFLY)
// Single-mapping POSIX platforms. Allocate as RW, later change to RX via mprotect.
void * code = MAP_FAILED;
#if defined(MAP_ANON)
int flags = MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANON;
#if defined(INFIX_OS_MACOS)
// On macOS, we perform a one-time check for JIT support.
static bool g_use_secure_jit_path = false;
static bool g_checked_jit_support = false;
if (!g_checked_jit_support) {
g_use_secure_jit_path = has_jit_entitlement();
INFIX_DEBUG_PRINTF("macOS JIT check: Entitlement found = %s. Using %s API.",
g_use_secure_jit_path ? "yes" : "no",
g_use_secure_jit_path ? "secure (MAP_JIT)" : "legacy (mprotect)");
g_checked_jit_support = true;
}
// If entitled, use the modern, more secure MAP_JIT flag.
if (g_use_secure_jit_path)
flags |= MAP_JIT;
#endif // INFIX_OS_MACOS
code = mmap(nullptr, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, flags, -1, 0);
#if defined(INFIX_OS_MACOS)
if (code != MAP_FAILED && g_use_secure_jit_path) {
// Switch thread to Write mode. enabled=0 means Write allowed.
g_macos_apis.pthread_jit_write_protect_np(0);
}
#endif
#endif // MAP_ANON
if (code == MAP_FAILED) { // Fallback for older systems without MAP_ANON
int fd = open("/dev/zero", O_RDWR);
if (fd != -1) {
code = mmap(nullptr, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0);
close(fd);
}
}
if (code == MAP_FAILED) {
_infix_set_system_error(INFIX_CATEGORY_ALLOCATION, INFIX_CODE_EXECUTABLE_MEMORY_FAILURE, errno, nullptr);
return exec;
}
exec.rw_ptr = code;
exec.rx_ptr = code;
#else
// Dual-mapping POSIX platforms (e.g., Linux, FreeBSD). Create two separate views of the same memory.
exec.shm_fd = create_anonymous_file();
if (exec.shm_fd < 0) {
_infix_set_system_error(
INFIX_CATEGORY_ALLOCATION, INFIX_CODE_EXECUTABLE_MEMORY_FAILURE, errno, "create_anonymous_file failed");
return exec;
}
if (ftruncate(exec.shm_fd, size) != 0) {
_infix_set_system_error(
INFIX_CATEGORY_ALLOCATION, INFIX_CODE_EXECUTABLE_MEMORY_FAILURE, errno, "ftruncate failed");
close(exec.shm_fd);
exec.shm_fd = -1; // Ensure clean state
return exec;
}
// The RW mapping.
exec.rw_ptr = mmap(nullptr, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, exec.shm_fd, 0);
// The RX mapping of the exact same physical memory.
exec.rx_ptr = mmap(nullptr, size, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC, MAP_SHARED, exec.shm_fd, 0);
// If either mapping fails, clean up both and return an error.
if (exec.rw_ptr == MAP_FAILED || exec.rx_ptr == MAP_FAILED) {
int err = errno; // Capture errno before cleanup
if (exec.rw_ptr != MAP_FAILED)
munmap(exec.rw_ptr, size);
if (exec.rx_ptr != MAP_FAILED)
munmap(exec.rx_ptr, size);
close(exec.shm_fd);
_infix_set_system_error(INFIX_CATEGORY_ALLOCATION, INFIX_CODE_EXECUTABLE_MEMORY_FAILURE, err, "mmap failed");
return (infix_executable_t){.rx_ptr = nullptr, .rw_ptr = nullptr, .size = 0, .shm_fd = -1};
}
// The mmap mappings hold a reference to the shared memory object, so we don't
// need the FD anymore. Keeping it open consumes a file descriptor per trampoline,
// causing "shm_open failed" after ~1024 trampolines.
close(exec.shm_fd);
exec.shm_fd = -1;
#endif
exec.size = size;
INFIX_DEBUG_PRINTF("Allocated JIT memory. RW at %p, RX at %p", exec.rw_ptr, exec.rx_ptr);
return exec;
}
infix/src/jit/executor.c view on Meta::CPAN
* @return `true` on success, `false` on failure.
*/
c23_nodiscard bool infix_executable_make_executable(infix_executable_t * exec,
c23_maybe_unused infix_executable_category_t category,
c23_maybe_unused uint32_t prologue_size,
c23_maybe_unused uint32_t epilogue_offset) {
if (exec->rw_ptr == nullptr || exec->size == 0)
return false;
// On AArch64 (and other RISC architectures), the instruction and data caches can be
// separate. We must explicitly flush the D-cache (where the JIT wrote the code)
// and invalidate the I-cache so the CPU fetches the new instructions.
// We might as well do it on x64 too.
#if defined(INFIX_COMPILER_MSVC)
// Use the Windows-specific API.
FlushInstructionCache(GetCurrentProcess(), exec->rw_ptr, exec->size);
#elif defined(INFIX_OS_MACOS)
// Use the Apple-specific API if available (required for Apple Silicon correctness)
if (g_macos_apis.sys_icache_invalidate)
g_macos_apis.sys_icache_invalidate(exec->rw_ptr, exec->size);
else
__builtin___clear_cache((char *)exec->rw_ptr, (char *)exec->rw_ptr + exec->size);
#elif defined(INFIX_ARCH_AARCH64)
// Robust manual cache clearing for AArch64 Linux/BSD.
// We clean the D-cache to point of unification and invalidate the I-cache.
uintptr_t start = (uintptr_t)exec->rw_ptr;
uintptr_t end = start + exec->size;
uintptr_t ctr_el0;
__asm__ __volatile__("mrs %0, ctr_el0" : "=r"(ctr_el0));
// D-cache line size is in bits [19:16] as log2 of number of words.
uintptr_t d_line_size = 4 << ((ctr_el0 >> 16) & 0xf);
for (uintptr_t addr = start & ~(d_line_size - 1); addr < end; addr += d_line_size)
__asm__ __volatile__("dc cvau, %0" ::"r"(addr) : "memory");
__asm__ __volatile__("dsb ish" ::: "memory");
// I-cache line size is in bits [3:0] as log2 of number of words.
uintptr_t i_line_size = 4 << (ctr_el0 & 0xf);
for (uintptr_t addr = start & ~(i_line_size - 1); addr < end; addr += i_line_size)
__asm__ __volatile__("ic ivau, %0" ::"r"(addr) : "memory");
__asm__ __volatile__("dsb ish\n\tisb" ::: "memory");
#else
// Use the GCC/Clang built-in for other platforms.
__builtin___clear_cache((char *)exec->rw_ptr, (char *)exec->rw_ptr + exec->size);
#endif
bool result = false;
#if defined(INFIX_OS_WINDOWS)
// On Windows, we register SEH unwind info before making the memory executable.
#if defined(INFIX_ARCH_X64)
_infix_register_seh_windows_x64(exec, category, prologue_size, epilogue_offset);
#elif defined(INFIX_ARCH_AARCH64)
_infix_register_seh_windows_arm64(exec, category, prologue_size, epilogue_offset);
#endif
// Finalize permissions to Read+Execute.
// We include the SEH metadata in the protected region.
result = VirtualProtect(exec->rw_ptr, exec->size + INFIX_SEH_METADATA_SIZE, PAGE_EXECUTE_READ, &(DWORD){0});
if (!result)
_infix_set_system_error(INFIX_CATEGORY_ALLOCATION, INFIX_CODE_PROTECTION_FAILURE, GetLastError(), nullptr);
#elif defined(INFIX_OS_MACOS)
static bool g_use_secure_jit_path = false;
static bool g_checked_jit_support = false;
if (!g_checked_jit_support) {
g_use_secure_jit_path = has_jit_entitlement();
g_checked_jit_support = true;
}
if (g_use_secure_jit_path && g_macos_apis.pthread_jit_write_protect_np) {
// Switch thread state to Execute allowed (enabled=1)
g_macos_apis.pthread_jit_write_protect_np(1);
result = true;
}
else {
result = (mprotect(exec->rw_ptr, exec->size, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC) == 0);
}
if (!result)
_infix_set_system_error(INFIX_CATEGORY_ALLOCATION, INFIX_CODE_PROTECTION_FAILURE, errno, nullptr);
#elif defined(INFIX_OS_ANDROID) || defined(INFIX_OS_OPENBSD) || defined(INFIX_OS_DRAGONFLY)
// Other single-mapping POSIX platforms use mprotect.
result = (mprotect(exec->rw_ptr, exec->size, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC) == 0);
if (!result)
_infix_set_system_error(INFIX_CATEGORY_ALLOCATION, INFIX_CODE_PROTECTION_FAILURE, errno, nullptr);
#else
// Dual-mapping POSIX (Linux, FreeBSD).
// The RX mapping is already executable.
#if defined(INFIX_OS_LINUX) && defined(INFIX_ARCH_X64)
_infix_register_eh_frame_linux_x64(exec, category);
#elif defined(INFIX_OS_LINUX) && defined(INFIX_ARCH_AARCH64)
_infix_register_eh_frame_arm64(exec, category);
#endif
// SECURITY CRITICAL: We MUST unmap the RW view now. If we leave it mapped,
// an attacker with a heap disclosure could find it and overwrite the JIT code,
// bypassing W^X.
if (munmap(exec->rw_ptr, exec->size) == 0) {
exec->rw_ptr = nullptr; // Clear the pointer to prevent double-free or misuse.
result = true;
}
else {
_infix_set_system_error(
INFIX_CATEGORY_ALLOCATION, INFIX_CODE_PROTECTION_FAILURE, errno, "munmap of RW view failed");
result = false;
}
#endif
if (result)
INFIX_DEBUG_PRINTF("Memory at %p is now executable.", exec->rx_ptr);
return result;
}
// Public API: Protected (Read-Only) Memory
/**
* @internal
* @brief Allocates a block of standard read-write memory for a context object.
*
* @details This is used to allocate the memory for an `infix_reverse_t` context. The
* memory is allocated as standard RW memory, populated, and then made read-only
* via `infix_protected_make_readonly` for security hardening.
*
* @param size The number of bytes to allocate.
* @return An `infix_protected_t` handle, or a zeroed struct on failure.
*/
c23_nodiscard infix_protected_t infix_protected_alloc(size_t size) {
infix_protected_t prot = {.rw_ptr = nullptr, .size = 0};
if (size == 0)
return prot;
#if defined(INFIX_OS_WINDOWS)
prot.rw_ptr = VirtualAlloc(nullptr, size, MEM_COMMIT | MEM_RESERVE, PAGE_READWRITE);
if (!prot.rw_ptr)
_infix_set_system_error(INFIX_CATEGORY_ALLOCATION, INFIX_CODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY, GetLastError(), nullptr);
#else
#if defined(MAP_ANON)
prot.rw_ptr = mmap(nullptr, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANON, -1, 0);
#else
int fd = open("/dev/zero", O_RDWR);
if (fd == -1)
prot.rw_ptr = MAP_FAILED;
else {
prot.rw_ptr = mmap(nullptr, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0);
close(fd);
}
#endif
if (prot.rw_ptr == MAP_FAILED) {
_infix_set_system_error(INFIX_CATEGORY_ALLOCATION, INFIX_CODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY, errno, nullptr);
prot.rw_ptr = nullptr;
}
#endif
if (prot.rw_ptr)
prot.size = size;
return prot;
}
/**
* @internal
* @brief Frees a block of protected memory.
* @param prot The memory block to free.
*/
void infix_protected_free(infix_protected_t prot) {
if (prot.size == 0)
return;
#if defined(INFIX_OS_WINDOWS)
VirtualFree(prot.rw_ptr, 0, MEM_RELEASE);
#else
munmap(prot.rw_ptr, prot.size);
#endif
}
/**
* @internal
* @brief Makes a block of memory read-only for security hardening.
*
* @details This function is called on the `infix_reverse_t` context after it has been
* fully initialized. By making the context read-only, it helps prevent bugs or
* security vulnerabilities from corrupting critical state like function pointers.
*
* @param prot The memory block to make read-only.
* @return `true` on success, `false` on failure.
*/
c23_nodiscard bool infix_protected_make_readonly(infix_protected_t prot) {
if (prot.size == 0)
return false;
bool result = false;
#if defined(INFIX_OS_WINDOWS)
result = VirtualProtect(prot.rw_ptr, prot.size, PAGE_READONLY, &(DWORD){0});
if (!result)
_infix_set_system_error(INFIX_CATEGORY_ALLOCATION, INFIX_CODE_PROTECTION_FAILURE, GetLastError(), nullptr);
#else
result = (mprotect(prot.rw_ptr, prot.size, PROT_READ) == 0);
if (!result)
_infix_set_system_error(INFIX_CATEGORY_ABI, INFIX_CODE_PROTECTION_FAILURE, errno, nullptr);
#endif
return result;
}
// Universal Reverse Call Dispatcher
/**
* @internal
* @brief The universal C entry point for all reverse call trampolines.
*
* @details The JIT-compiled stub for a reverse call performs the minimal work of
* marshalling all arguments from their native ABI locations (registers and stack)
* into a standard `void**` array on its own stack. It then calls this function.
*
* This dispatcher inspects the `infix_reverse_t` context and takes one of two paths:
*
* 1. **Type-Safe Callback Path:** If `cached_forward_trampoline` is not null, it
* means this is a type-safe callback. The dispatcher uses this pre-generated
* forward trampoline to call the user's C handler, which has a clean, native
* C function signature.
*
* 2. **Generic Closure Path:** If there is no cached trampoline, it's a generic
* closure. The dispatcher directly calls the user's generic handler function,
* passing it the context, return buffer, and the `void**` args array.
*
* @param context The `infix_reverse_t` context for this call.
* @param return_value_ptr A pointer to the stack buffer where the return value must be written.
* @param args_array A pointer to the `void**` array of argument pointers.
*/
void infix_internal_dispatch_callback_fn_impl(infix_reverse_t * context, void * return_value_ptr, void ** args_array) {
INFIX_DEBUG_PRINTF("Dispatching reverse call. Context: %p, User Fn: %p, ret=%p, args=%p",
(void *)context,
context->user_callback_fn,
return_value_ptr,
(void *)args_array);
if (args_array) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < context->num_args; i++) {
INFIX_DEBUG_PRINTF(
" args[%zu] = %p (val: 0x%04X)", i, args_array[i], args_array[i] ? *(uint16_t *)args_array[i] : 0);
}
}
if (context->user_callback_fn == nullptr) {
// If no handler is set, do nothing. If the function has a return value,
// it's good practice to zero it out to avoid returning garbage.
if (return_value_ptr && context->return_type->size > 0)
infix_memset(return_value_ptr, 0, context->return_type->size);
( run in 0.527 second using v1.01-cache-2.11-cpan-39bf76dae61 )