CGI

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      - CVE-2026-120632: a crafted multipart/related Content-Type header
        caused cubic regex backtracking (~15s of CPU for an 8KB header, no
        body needed)
      - CVE-2026-120650: request size, param and upload limits were missing
        or unenforced: $POST_MAX defaulted to no limit, and was not enforced
        at all for multipart bodies without a CONTENT_LENGTH (chunked
        encoding), or for the boundary line of a multipart body without a
        boundary=; PUTDATA/POSTDATA/PATCHDATA bodies were read into memory
        in one go; and there was no limit on the number of params or
        uploads in a request (a 40MB form body took 9s and 1.5GB of memory
        to parse) - see the new $CGI::MAX_PARAMS and $CGI::MAX_UPLOADS
      - CVE-2026-120651: an infinite loop reading a short PUT/POST/PATCH
        body when $DISABLE_UPLOADS was set
      - CVE-2026-120645: scrolling_list used submitted values as a regex
        for optgroups
      - CVE-2026-120646: uploadInfo() dereferenced plain strings as symbolic
        references, so died when given some, e.g. "0"
    - header injection / response splitting:
      - CVE-2026-120639: with autoEscape off, header() decoded HTML entities
        in extra header values after checking them for newlines, so
        
 became CRLF; and multipart_start() and
        CGI::Push::do_push did no newline checks
      - CVE-2026-120644: CGI::Cookie path/domain/expires were not checked,
        so ";" injected other cookie attributes
      - CVE-2026-120647: the header() -attachment filename did not escape
        quotes
    - open redirects, and URLs/forms pointing at other hosts:
      - CVE-2026-120633: url(), self_url(), virtual_host(), virtual_port()
        trusted the client supplied X-Forwarded-Host header, and an
        unvalidated Host, affecting the default redirect() location,
        start_html(-base=>1) and default start_form() actions
      - CVE-2026-120638: redirect() HTML decoded its URL after the
        application had checked it, e.g. "/&#47evil.example/" became
        "//evil.example/"
      - CVE-2026-120636: URLs built from the client supplied REQUEST_URI
        could be protocol relative (//evil.example), absolute-form
        (http://evil.example/) or have backslashes, and url(-relative=>1)
        could return e.g. javascript:alert(1)
    - cross site scripting:
      - CVE-2026-120643: url()/self_url() could contain a raw single quote
        (URI->canonical decodes %27)
      - CVE-2026-120648: comment() text could end the HTML comment
    - information disclosure:
      - CVE-2026-120634: CGI::Carp warnings buffered for warningsToBrowser
        were not reset between requests in persistent environments, so one
        user's warnings could be shown to another
    - CVE-2026-120635: multipart parsing differentials (fields smuggled past
      a filtering proxy or WAF that parses per the RFCs):
      - the boundary was matched anywhere, not only at the start of a line
      - the boundary was used without its "--" for some User-Agents
      - Content-Disposition name/filename were found inside other
        parameters' quoted values
      - boundaries over the RFC 2046 limit corrupted and merged parts
    - other:
      - CVE-2026-120641: client supplied upload filenames could contain a
        path, allowing path traversal in applications that use them to save
        the file
      - CVE-2026-120640: clients could set POSTDATA/PUTDATA/PATCHDATA/
        XForms:Model through the query string or a form field,
        indistinguishable from the real body (e.g. a cross site HTML form
        posting to a JSON endpoint)
      - CVE-2026-120642: under taint mode the upload filename, uploadInfo()
        values, path_info, Accept(), and some cookie and url_param values
        were untainted
      - CVE-2026-120637: an unrecognised REQUEST_METHOD (e.g. OPTIONS) made
        the process' own command line arguments the request params

    [ BREAKING CHANGES ]
    - X-Forwarded-Host is no longer used by url()/self_url()/virtual_host()
      /virtual_port(), and Host is only used if it is a valid host[:port].
      behind a reverse proxy pass the right Host / SERVER_NAME, or set
      $CGI::TRUST_X_FORWARDED_HOST = 1
    - $CGI::POST_MAX now defaults to 128MB, set it to -1 for no limit
    - $CGI::MAX_PARAMS (10,000) and $CGI::MAX_UPLOADS (1,000) are new
      limits, set them to -1 for no limit. requests exceeding any of the
      limits get a "413 Request entity too large" cgi_error
    - upload filenames (param('upload'), the upload filehandle, and the
      upload_hook) have any directory part and control characters removed.
      the raw value is in uploadInfo($fh)->{'Content-Disposition'}, or set
      $CGI::SANITIZE_UPLOAD_FILENAMES = 0
    - redirect() URLs and header() values are no longer HTML unescaped -
      pass e.g. /x?a=1&b=2, not /x?a=1&b=2
    - multipart_start() header names are now capitalised like header()'s
    - url(-relative=>1) prefixes a result that looks like it has a scheme
      with ./, and URLs built from REQUEST_URI are reduced to a path on
      this host (request_uri() still returns the literal value)
    - url()/self_url() percent encode single quotes
    - CGI::Cookie dies if path, expires or domain contain ";" or control
      characters, or domain isn't a valid host name
    - header() -attachment backslash escapes " and \ in the filename
    - comment() inserts a space into any "--" in its text
    - client sent params named POSTDATA, PUTDATA, PATCHDATA or XForms:Model
      are ignored (an application's own initializer can still set them)
    - under taint mode more request data is tainted, as listed above, so
      must be untainted before use in e.g. open() or system()
    - malformed multipart bodies are rejected: boundaries over 200
      characters, a body supplied boundary not starting with --, or a
      boundary line over 1KB. multipart/related requires the media type to
      be exactly multipart/related (its parameters may now be in any order)
    - offline (command line) debugging mode is only used when there is no
      REQUEST_METHOD and no CGI server, FastCGI or mod_perl
    - PUTDATA/POSTDATA/PATCHDATA upload_hook callbacks are now called per
      4K chunk, as they already were for multipart uploads
    - the IE 3.01 for Mac / DreamPassport multipart special case is removed

    [ FIX ]
    - chunked (no CONTENT_LENGTH) multipart requests without a boundary=
      always failed, and the boundary line read now works under mod_perl
    - read_postdata_putdata ignored SPIN_LOOP_MAX, dying on the first zero
      length read
    - a second CGI->new in the same request lost cgi_error, and shared the
      first object's param arrays
    - optgroup() ignored the documented -novals option
    - import_names() wiped nested packages when clearing the namespace
    - an upload whose filename was "0" lost its name
    - an empty extra header() value came out as a lone "

    [ META ]
    - all modules are now version 5.00, including CGI::Cookie (was 4.59)

    [ TESTING ]



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