Socket-Class
view release on metacpan or search on metacpan
xs/sc_ssl/openssl/source/apps/pkcs12.c view on Meta::CPAN
bagnid = OBJ_obj2nid (p7->type);
if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_data) {
bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7data(p7);
if (options & INFO) BIO_printf (bio_err, "PKCS7 Data\n");
} else if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_encrypted) {
if (options & INFO) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "PKCS7 Encrypted data: ");
alg_print(bio_err,
p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm);
}
bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(p7, pass, passlen);
} else continue;
if (!bags) goto err;
if (!dump_certs_pkeys_bags (out, bags, pass, passlen,
options, pempass)) {
sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free (bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free);
goto err;
}
sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free (bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free);
bags = NULL;
}
xs/sc_ssl/openssl/source/crypto/engine/eng_padlock.c view on Meta::CPAN
{
asm volatile ("pushfl; popfl");
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_AES
/*
* This is heuristic key context tracing. At first one
* believes that one should use atomic swap instructions,
* but it's not actually necessary. Point is that if
* padlock_saved_context was changed by another thread
* after we've read it and before we compare it with cdata,
* our key *shall* be reloaded upon thread context switch
* and we are therefore set in either case...
*/
static inline void
padlock_verify_context(struct padlock_cipher_data *cdata)
{
asm volatile (
"pushfl\n"
" btl $30,(%%esp)\n"
" jnc 1f\n"
" cmpl %2,%1\n"
" je 1f\n"
" popfl\n"
" subl $4,%%esp\n"
"1: addl $4,%%esp\n"
" movl %2,%0"
:"+m"(padlock_saved_context)
: "r"(padlock_saved_context), "r"(cdata) : "cc");
}
/* Template for padlock_xcrypt_* modes */
/* BIG FAT WARNING:
* The offsets used with 'leal' instructions
* describe items of the 'padlock_cipher_data'
* structure.
*/
#define PADLOCK_XCRYPT_ASM(name,rep_xcrypt) \
static inline void *name(size_t cnt, \
struct padlock_cipher_data *cdata, \
void *out, const void *inp) \
{ void *iv; \
asm volatile ( "pushl %%ebx\n" \
" leal 16(%0),%%edx\n" \
" leal 32(%0),%%ebx\n" \
rep_xcrypt "\n" \
" popl %%ebx" \
: "=a"(iv), "=c"(cnt), "=D"(out), "=S"(inp) \
: "0"(cdata), "1"(cnt), "2"(out), "3"(inp) \
: "edx", "cc", "memory"); \
return iv; \
}
/* Generate all functions with appropriate opcodes */
PADLOCK_XCRYPT_ASM(padlock_xcrypt_ecb, ".byte 0xf3,0x0f,0xa7,0xc8") /* rep xcryptecb */
PADLOCK_XCRYPT_ASM(padlock_xcrypt_cbc, ".byte 0xf3,0x0f,0xa7,0xd0") /* rep xcryptcbc */
PADLOCK_XCRYPT_ASM(padlock_xcrypt_cfb, ".byte 0xf3,0x0f,0xa7,0xe0") /* rep xcryptcfb */
PADLOCK_XCRYPT_ASM(padlock_xcrypt_ofb, ".byte 0xf3,0x0f,0xa7,0xe8") /* rep xcryptofb */
#endif
xs/sc_ssl/openssl/source/crypto/engine/eng_padlock.c view on Meta::CPAN
_asm _emit 0x0f _asm _emit 0xa7 \
_asm _emit code
/* BIG FAT WARNING:
* The offsets used with 'lea' instructions
* describe items of the 'padlock_cipher_data'
* structure.
*/
#define PADLOCK_XCRYPT_ASM(name,code) \
static void * __fastcall \
name (size_t cnt, void *cdata, \
void *outp, const void *inp) \
{ _asm mov eax,edx \
_asm lea edx,[eax+16] \
_asm lea ebx,[eax+32] \
_asm mov edi,outp \
_asm mov esi,inp \
REP_XCRYPT(code) \
}
PADLOCK_XCRYPT_ASM(padlock_xcrypt_ecb,0xc8)
xs/sc_ssl/openssl/source/crypto/engine/eng_padlock.c view on Meta::CPAN
padlock_xstore(void *outp,unsigned int code)
{ _asm mov edi,ecx
_asm _emit 0x0f _asm _emit 0xa7 _asm _emit 0xc0
}
static void __fastcall
padlock_reload_key(void)
{ _asm pushfd _asm popfd }
static void __fastcall
padlock_verify_context(void *cdata)
{ _asm {
pushfd
bt DWORD PTR[esp],30
jnc skip
cmp ecx,padlock_saved_context
je skip
popfd
sub esp,4
skip: add esp,4
mov padlock_saved_context,ecx
xs/sc_ssl/openssl/source/crypto/engine/eng_padlock.c view on Meta::CPAN
}
return 1;
}
/* Prepare the encryption key for PadLock usage */
static int
padlock_aes_init_key (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
{
struct padlock_cipher_data *cdata;
int key_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8;
if (key==NULL) return 0; /* ERROR */
cdata = ALIGNED_CIPHER_DATA(ctx);
memset(cdata, 0, sizeof(struct padlock_cipher_data));
/* Prepare Control word. */
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx) == EVP_CIPH_OFB_MODE)
cdata->cword.b.encdec = 0;
else
cdata->cword.b.encdec = (ctx->encrypt == 0);
cdata->cword.b.rounds = 10 + (key_len - 128) / 32;
cdata->cword.b.ksize = (key_len - 128) / 64;
switch(key_len) {
case 128:
/* PadLock can generate an extended key for
AES128 in hardware */
memcpy(cdata->ks.rd_key, key, AES_KEY_SIZE_128);
cdata->cword.b.keygen = 0;
break;
case 192:
case 256:
/* Generate an extended AES key in software.
Needed for AES192/AES256 */
/* Well, the above applies to Stepping 8 CPUs
and is listed as hardware errata. They most
likely will fix it at some point and then
a check for stepping would be due here. */
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CFB_MODE ||
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx) == EVP_CIPH_OFB_MODE ||
enc)
AES_set_encrypt_key(key, key_len, &cdata->ks);
else
AES_set_decrypt_key(key, key_len, &cdata->ks);
#ifndef AES_ASM
/* OpenSSL C functions use byte-swapped extended key. */
padlock_bswapl(&cdata->ks);
#endif
cdata->cword.b.keygen = 1;
break;
default:
/* ERROR */
return 0;
}
/*
* This is done to cover for cases when user reuses the
* context for new key. The catch is that if we don't do
xs/sc_ssl/openssl/source/crypto/engine/eng_padlock.c view on Meta::CPAN
/*
* Simplified version of padlock_aes_cipher() used when
* 1) both input and output buffers are at aligned addresses.
* or when
* 2) running on a newer CPU that doesn't require aligned buffers.
*/
static int
padlock_aes_cipher_omnivorous(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out_arg,
const unsigned char *in_arg, size_t nbytes)
{
struct padlock_cipher_data *cdata;
void *iv;
cdata = ALIGNED_CIPHER_DATA(ctx);
padlock_verify_context(cdata);
switch (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx)) {
case EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE:
padlock_xcrypt_ecb(nbytes/AES_BLOCK_SIZE, cdata, out_arg, in_arg);
break;
case EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE:
memcpy(cdata->iv, ctx->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
iv = padlock_xcrypt_cbc(nbytes/AES_BLOCK_SIZE, cdata, out_arg, in_arg);
memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
break;
case EVP_CIPH_CFB_MODE:
memcpy(cdata->iv, ctx->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
iv = padlock_xcrypt_cfb(nbytes/AES_BLOCK_SIZE, cdata, out_arg, in_arg);
memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
break;
case EVP_CIPH_OFB_MODE:
memcpy(cdata->iv, ctx->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
padlock_xcrypt_ofb(nbytes/AES_BLOCK_SIZE, cdata, out_arg, in_arg);
memcpy(ctx->iv, cdata->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
break;
default:
return 0;
}
memset(cdata->iv, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
return 1;
}
#ifndef PADLOCK_CHUNK
# define PADLOCK_CHUNK 512 /* Must be a power of 2 larger than 16 */
#endif
#if PADLOCK_CHUNK<16 || PADLOCK_CHUNK&(PADLOCK_CHUNK-1)
# error "insane PADLOCK_CHUNK..."
#endif
/* Re-align the arguments to 16-Bytes boundaries and run the
encryption function itself. This function is not AES-specific. */
static int
padlock_aes_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out_arg,
const unsigned char *in_arg, size_t nbytes)
{
struct padlock_cipher_data *cdata;
const void *inp;
unsigned char *out;
void *iv;
int inp_misaligned, out_misaligned, realign_in_loop;
size_t chunk, allocated=0;
/* ctx->num is maintained in byte-oriented modes,
such as CFB and OFB... */
if ((chunk = ctx->num)) { /* borrow chunk variable */
unsigned char *ivp=ctx->iv;
xs/sc_ssl/openssl/source/crypto/engine/eng_padlock.c view on Meta::CPAN
if (out_misaligned) {
/* optmize for small input */
allocated = (chunk<nbytes?PADLOCK_CHUNK:nbytes);
out = alloca(0x10 + allocated);
out = NEAREST_ALIGNED(out);
}
else
out = out_arg;
cdata = ALIGNED_CIPHER_DATA(ctx);
padlock_verify_context(cdata);
switch (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx)) {
case EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE:
do {
if (inp_misaligned)
inp = padlock_memcpy(out, in_arg, chunk);
else
inp = in_arg;
in_arg += chunk;
padlock_xcrypt_ecb(chunk/AES_BLOCK_SIZE, cdata, out, inp);
if (out_misaligned)
out_arg = padlock_memcpy(out_arg, out, chunk) + chunk;
else
out = out_arg+=chunk;
nbytes -= chunk;
chunk = PADLOCK_CHUNK;
} while (nbytes);
break;
case EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE:
memcpy(cdata->iv, ctx->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
goto cbc_shortcut;
do {
if (iv != cdata->iv)
memcpy(cdata->iv, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
chunk = PADLOCK_CHUNK;
cbc_shortcut: /* optimize for small input */
if (inp_misaligned)
inp = padlock_memcpy(out, in_arg, chunk);
else
inp = in_arg;
in_arg += chunk;
iv = padlock_xcrypt_cbc(chunk/AES_BLOCK_SIZE, cdata, out, inp);
if (out_misaligned)
out_arg = padlock_memcpy(out_arg, out, chunk) + chunk;
else
out = out_arg+=chunk;
} while (nbytes -= chunk);
memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
break;
case EVP_CIPH_CFB_MODE:
memcpy (iv = cdata->iv, ctx->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
chunk &= ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE-1);
if (chunk) goto cfb_shortcut;
else goto cfb_skiploop;
do {
if (iv != cdata->iv)
memcpy(cdata->iv, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
chunk = PADLOCK_CHUNK;
cfb_shortcut: /* optimize for small input */
if (inp_misaligned)
inp = padlock_memcpy(out, in_arg, chunk);
else
inp = in_arg;
in_arg += chunk;
iv = padlock_xcrypt_cfb(chunk/AES_BLOCK_SIZE, cdata, out, inp);
if (out_misaligned)
out_arg = padlock_memcpy(out_arg, out, chunk) + chunk;
else
out = out_arg+=chunk;
nbytes -= chunk;
} while (nbytes >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
cfb_skiploop:
if (nbytes) {
unsigned char *ivp = cdata->iv;
if (iv != ivp) {
memcpy(ivp, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
iv = ivp;
}
ctx->num = nbytes;
if (cdata->cword.b.encdec) {
cdata->cword.b.encdec=0;
padlock_reload_key();
padlock_xcrypt_ecb(1,cdata,ivp,ivp);
cdata->cword.b.encdec=1;
padlock_reload_key();
while(nbytes) {
unsigned char c = *(in_arg++);
*(out_arg++) = c ^ *ivp;
*(ivp++) = c, nbytes--;
}
}
else { padlock_reload_key();
padlock_xcrypt_ecb(1,cdata,ivp,ivp);
padlock_reload_key();
while (nbytes) {
*ivp = *(out_arg++) = *(in_arg++) ^ *ivp;
ivp++, nbytes--;
}
}
}
memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
break;
case EVP_CIPH_OFB_MODE:
memcpy(cdata->iv, ctx->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
chunk &= ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE-1);
if (chunk) do {
if (inp_misaligned)
inp = padlock_memcpy(out, in_arg, chunk);
else
inp = in_arg;
in_arg += chunk;
padlock_xcrypt_ofb(chunk/AES_BLOCK_SIZE, cdata, out, inp);
if (out_misaligned)
out_arg = padlock_memcpy(out_arg, out, chunk) + chunk;
else
out = out_arg+=chunk;
nbytes -= chunk;
chunk = PADLOCK_CHUNK;
} while (nbytes >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
if (nbytes) {
unsigned char *ivp = cdata->iv;
ctx->num = nbytes;
padlock_reload_key(); /* empirically found */
padlock_xcrypt_ecb(1,cdata,ivp,ivp);
padlock_reload_key(); /* empirically found */
while (nbytes) {
*(out_arg++) = *(in_arg++) ^ *ivp;
ivp++, nbytes--;
}
}
memcpy(ctx->iv, cdata->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
break;
default:
return 0;
}
/* Clean the realign buffer if it was used */
if (out_misaligned) {
volatile unsigned long *p=(void *)out;
size_t n = allocated/sizeof(*p);
while (n--) *p++=0;
}
memset(cdata->iv, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
return 1;
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_AES */
/* ===== Random Number Generator ===== */
/*
* This code is not engaged. The reason is that it does not comply
* with recommendations for VIA RNG usage for secure applications
xs/sc_ssl/openssl/source/crypto/krb5/krb5_asn.c view on Meta::CPAN
} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(KRB5_PRINCNAME)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(KRB5_PRINCNAME)
/* [APPLICATION 1] = 0x61 */
ASN1_SEQUENCE(KRB5_TKTBODY) = {
ASN1_EXP(KRB5_TKTBODY, tktvno, ASN1_INTEGER, 0),
ASN1_EXP(KRB5_TKTBODY, realm, ASN1_GENERALSTRING, 1),
ASN1_EXP(KRB5_TKTBODY, sname, KRB5_PRINCNAME, 2),
ASN1_EXP(KRB5_TKTBODY, encdata, KRB5_ENCDATA, 3)
} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(KRB5_TKTBODY)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(KRB5_TKTBODY)
ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(KRB5_TICKET) =
ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_EXPTAG|ASN1_TFLG_APPLICATION, 1,
KRB5_TICKET, KRB5_TKTBODY)
ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(KRB5_TICKET)
xs/sc_ssl/openssl/source/crypto/krb5/krb5_asn.h view on Meta::CPAN
/* ASN.1 from Kerberos RFC 1510
*/
/* EncryptedData ::= SEQUENCE {
** etype[0] INTEGER, -- EncryptionType
** kvno[1] INTEGER OPTIONAL,
** cipher[2] OCTET STRING -- ciphertext
** }
*/
typedef struct krb5_encdata_st
{
ASN1_INTEGER *etype;
ASN1_INTEGER *kvno;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *cipher;
} KRB5_ENCDATA;
DECLARE_STACK_OF(KRB5_ENCDATA)
/* PrincipalName ::= SEQUENCE {
** name-type[0] INTEGER,
xs/sc_ssl/openssl/source/crypto/krb5/krb5_asn.h view on Meta::CPAN
** realm[1] Realm,
** sname[2] PrincipalName,
** enc-part[3] EncryptedData
** }
*/
typedef struct krb5_tktbody_st
{
ASN1_INTEGER *tktvno;
ASN1_GENERALSTRING *realm;
KRB5_PRINCNAME *sname;
KRB5_ENCDATA *encdata;
} KRB5_TKTBODY;
typedef STACK_OF(KRB5_TKTBODY) KRB5_TICKET;
DECLARE_STACK_OF(KRB5_TKTBODY)
/* AP-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 14] SEQUENCE {
** pvno[0] INTEGER,
** msg-type[1] INTEGER,
** ap-options[2] APOptions,
xs/sc_ssl/openssl/source/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c view on Meta::CPAN
if(!PKCS7_type_is_data(p7))
{
PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_UNPACK_P7DATA,PKCS12_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_DATA);
return NULL;
}
return ASN1_item_unpack(p7->d.data, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS));
}
/* Turn a stack of SAFEBAGS into a PKCS#7 encrypted data ContentInfo */
PKCS7 *PKCS12_pack_p7encdata(int pbe_nid, const char *pass, int passlen,
unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter,
STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags)
{
PKCS7 *p7;
X509_ALGOR *pbe;
if (!(p7 = PKCS7_new())) {
PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7ENCDATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
if(!PKCS7_set_type(p7, NID_pkcs7_encrypted)) {
xs/sc_ssl/openssl/source/crypto/pkcs12/p12_add.c view on Meta::CPAN
if (!(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->enc_data =
PKCS12_item_i2d_encrypt(pbe, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS), pass, passlen,
bags, 1))) {
PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7ENCDATA, PKCS12_R_ENCRYPT_ERROR);
return NULL;
}
return p7;
}
STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(PKCS7 *p7, const char *pass, int passlen)
{
if(!PKCS7_type_is_encrypted(p7)) return NULL;
return PKCS12_item_decrypt_d2i(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm,
ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS),
pass, passlen,
p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->enc_data, 1);
}
PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *PKCS12_decrypt_skey(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *pass,
int passlen)
xs/sc_ssl/openssl/source/crypto/pkcs12/p12_crt.c view on Meta::CPAN
}
else
free_safes = 0;
if (nid_safe == 0)
nid_safe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC;
if (nid_safe == -1)
p7 = PKCS12_pack_p7data(bags);
else
p7 = PKCS12_pack_p7encdata(nid_safe, pass, -1, NULL, 0,
iter, bags);
if (!p7)
goto err;
if (!sk_PKCS7_push(*psafes, p7))
goto err;
return 1;
err:
xs/sc_ssl/openssl/source/crypto/pkcs12/p12_kiss.c view on Meta::CPAN
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *keyid = NULL;
char keymatch = 0;
if (!(asafes = PKCS12_unpack_authsafes (p12))) return 0;
for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_num (asafes); i++) {
p7 = sk_PKCS7_value (asafes, i);
bagnid = OBJ_obj2nid (p7->type);
if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_data) {
bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7data(p7);
} else if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_encrypted) {
bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(p7, pass, passlen);
} else continue;
if (!bags) {
sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);
return 0;
}
if (!parse_bags(bags, pass, passlen, pkey, cert, ca,
&keyid, &keymatch)) {
sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free);
sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);
return 0;
xs/sc_ssl/openssl/source/crypto/pkcs12/p12_npas.c view on Meta::CPAN
unsigned int maclen;
if (!(asafes = PKCS12_unpack_authsafes(p12))) return 0;
if(!(newsafes = sk_PKCS7_new_null())) return 0;
for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_num (asafes); i++) {
p7 = sk_PKCS7_value(asafes, i);
bagnid = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_data) {
bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7data(p7);
} else if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_encrypted) {
bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(p7, oldpass, -1);
alg_get(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm,
&pbe_nid, &pbe_iter, &pbe_saltlen);
} else continue;
if (!bags) {
sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);
return 0;
}
if (!newpass_bags(bags, oldpass, newpass)) {
sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free);
sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);
return 0;
}
/* Repack bag in same form with new password */
if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_data) p7new = PKCS12_pack_p7data(bags);
else p7new = PKCS12_pack_p7encdata(pbe_nid, newpass, -1, NULL,
pbe_saltlen, pbe_iter, bags);
sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free);
if(!p7new) {
sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);
return 0;
}
sk_PKCS7_push(newsafes, p7new);
}
sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);
xs/sc_ssl/openssl/source/crypto/pkcs12/pk12err.c view on Meta::CPAN
{ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_INIT), "PKCS12_init"},
{ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_ITEM_DECRYPT_D2I), "PKCS12_item_decrypt_d2i"},
{ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_ITEM_I2D_ENCRYPT), "PKCS12_item_i2d_encrypt"},
{ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_ITEM_PACK_SAFEBAG), "PKCS12_item_pack_safebag"},
{ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_KEY_GEN_ASC), "PKCS12_key_gen_asc"},
{ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_KEY_GEN_UNI), "PKCS12_key_gen_uni"},
{ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_MAKE_KEYBAG), "PKCS12_MAKE_KEYBAG"},
{ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_MAKE_SHKEYBAG), "PKCS12_MAKE_SHKEYBAG"},
{ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_NEWPASS), "PKCS12_newpass"},
{ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7DATA), "PKCS12_pack_p7data"},
{ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7ENCDATA), "PKCS12_pack_p7encdata"},
{ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE), "PKCS12_parse"},
{ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PBE_CRYPT), "PKCS12_pbe_crypt"},
{ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PBE_KEYIVGEN), "PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen"},
{ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SETUP_MAC), "PKCS12_setup_mac"},
{ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SET_MAC), "PKCS12_set_mac"},
{ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_UNPACK_AUTHSAFES), "PKCS12_unpack_authsafes"},
{ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_UNPACK_P7DATA), "PKCS12_unpack_p7data"},
{ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_VERIFY_MAC), "PKCS12_verify_mac"},
{ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS8_ADD_KEYUSAGE), "PKCS8_add_keyusage"},
{ERR_FUNC(PKCS12_F_PKCS8_ENCRYPT), "PKCS8_encrypt"},
xs/sc_ssl/openssl/source/crypto/pkcs12/pkcs12.h view on Meta::CPAN
#define M_PKCS12_x5092certbag PKCS12_x5092certbag
#define M_PKCS12_x509crl2certbag PKCS12_x509crl2certbag
#define M_PKCS12_certbag2x509 PKCS12_certbag2x509
#define M_PKCS12_certbag2x509crl PKCS12_certbag2x509crl
#define M_PKCS12_unpack_p7data PKCS12_unpack_p7data
#define M_PKCS12_pack_authsafes PKCS12_pack_authsafes
#define M_PKCS12_unpack_authsafes PKCS12_unpack_authsafes
#define M_PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata
#define M_PKCS12_decrypt_skey PKCS12_decrypt_skey
#define M_PKCS8_decrypt PKCS8_decrypt
#define M_PKCS12_bag_type(bg) OBJ_obj2nid((bg)->type)
#define M_PKCS12_cert_bag_type(bg) OBJ_obj2nid((bg)->value.bag->type)
#define M_PKCS12_crl_bag_type M_PKCS12_cert_bag_type
#define PKCS12_get_attr(bag, attr_nid) \
PKCS12_get_attr_gen(bag->attrib, attr_nid)
xs/sc_ssl/openssl/source/crypto/pkcs12/pkcs12.h view on Meta::CPAN
X509_SIG *PKCS8_encrypt(int pbe_nid, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
const char *pass, int passlen,
unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter,
PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8);
PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_MAKE_SHKEYBAG(int pbe_nid, const char *pass,
int passlen, unsigned char *salt,
int saltlen, int iter,
PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8);
PKCS7 *PKCS12_pack_p7data(STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *sk);
STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *PKCS12_unpack_p7data(PKCS7 *p7);
PKCS7 *PKCS12_pack_p7encdata(int pbe_nid, const char *pass, int passlen,
unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter,
STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags);
STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(PKCS7 *p7, const char *pass, int passlen);
int PKCS12_pack_authsafes(PKCS12 *p12, STACK_OF(PKCS7) *safes);
STACK_OF(PKCS7) *PKCS12_unpack_authsafes(PKCS12 *p12);
int PKCS12_add_localkeyid(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, unsigned char *name, int namelen);
int PKCS12_add_friendlyname_asc(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *name,
int namelen);
int PKCS12_add_CSPName_asc(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *name,
int namelen);
int PKCS12_add_friendlyname_uni(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const unsigned char *name,
xs/sc_ssl/openssl/source/ms/libeay32.def view on Meta::CPAN
PKCS12_item_decrypt_d2i @2526
PKCS12_item_i2d_encrypt @2696
PKCS12_item_pack_safebag @2887
PKCS12_it @2651
PKCS12_key_gen_asc @1276
PKCS12_key_gen_uni @1277
PKCS12_new @1290
PKCS12_newpass @2141
PKCS12_pack_authsafes @2721
PKCS12_pack_p7data @1266
PKCS12_pack_p7encdata @1267
PKCS12_parse @1304
PKCS12_pbe_crypt @1272
PKCS12_set_mac @1280
PKCS12_setup_mac @1281
PKCS12_unpack_authsafes @2639
PKCS12_unpack_p7data @2684
PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata @2746
PKCS12_verify_mac @1279
PKCS12_x5092certbag @3108
PKCS12_x509crl2certbag @2739
PKCS1_MGF1 @3324
PKCS5_PBE_add @1775
PKCS5_PBE_keyivgen @1789
PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1 @1795
PKCS5_pbe2_set @1794
PKCS5_pbe_set @1323
PKCS5_v2_PBE_keyivgen @1796
xs/sc_ssl/openssl/source/ssl/kssl.c view on Meta::CPAN
{
free(new5ticket);
BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
"Error building ticket server principal.\n");
kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
return krb5rc; /* or KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC; */
}
krb5_princ_type(krb5context, new5ticket->server) =
asn1ticket->sname->nametype->data[0];
new5ticket->enc_part.enctype = asn1ticket->encdata->etype->data[0];
new5ticket->enc_part.kvno = asn1ticket->encdata->kvno->data[0];
new5ticket->enc_part.ciphertext.length =
asn1ticket->encdata->cipher->length;
if ((new5ticket->enc_part.ciphertext.data =
calloc(1, asn1ticket->encdata->cipher->length)) == NULL)
{
free(new5ticket);
BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
"Error allocating cipher in krb5ticket.\n");
kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
}
else
{
memcpy(new5ticket->enc_part.ciphertext.data,
asn1ticket->encdata->cipher->data,
asn1ticket->encdata->cipher->length);
}
*krb5ticket = new5ticket;
return 0;
}
/* Given krb5 service name in KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx (typically "kssl"),
** and krb5 AP_REQ message & message length,
** Return Kerberos session key and client principle
xs/sc_ssl/openssl/source/util/libeay.num view on Meta::CPAN
AUTHORITY_KEYID_free 1257 EXIST::FUNCTION:
ASN1_seq_unpack 1258 EXIST::FUNCTION:
ASN1_seq_pack 1259 EXIST::FUNCTION:
ASN1_unpack_string 1260 EXIST::FUNCTION:
ASN1_pack_string 1261 EXIST::FUNCTION:
PKCS12_pack_safebag 1262 NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
PKCS12_MAKE_KEYBAG 1263 EXIST::FUNCTION:
PKCS8_encrypt 1264 EXIST::FUNCTION:
PKCS12_MAKE_SHKEYBAG 1265 EXIST::FUNCTION:
PKCS12_pack_p7data 1266 EXIST::FUNCTION:
PKCS12_pack_p7encdata 1267 EXIST::FUNCTION:
PKCS12_add_localkeyid 1268 EXIST::FUNCTION:
PKCS12_add_friendlyname_asc 1269 EXIST::FUNCTION:
PKCS12_add_friendlyname_uni 1270 EXIST::FUNCTION:
PKCS12_get_friendlyname 1271 EXIST::FUNCTION:
PKCS12_pbe_crypt 1272 EXIST::FUNCTION:
PKCS12_decrypt_d2i 1273 NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
PKCS12_i2d_encrypt 1274 NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
PKCS12_init 1275 EXIST::FUNCTION:
PKCS12_key_gen_asc 1276 EXIST::FUNCTION:
PKCS12_key_gen_uni 1277 EXIST::FUNCTION:
xs/sc_ssl/openssl/source/util/libeay.num view on Meta::CPAN
RSAPublicKey_it 2737 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:RSA
i2d_OCSP_REQUEST 2738 EXIST::FUNCTION:
PKCS12_x509crl2certbag 2739 EXIST::FUNCTION:
OCSP_SERVICELOC_it 2740 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
OCSP_SERVICELOC_it 2740 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
ASN1_item_sign 2741 EXIST::FUNCTION:EVP
X509_CRL_set_issuer_name 2742 EXIST::FUNCTION:
OBJ_NAME_do_all_sorted 2743 EXIST::FUNCTION:
i2d_OCSP_BASICRESP 2744 EXIST::FUNCTION:
i2d_OCSP_RESPBYTES 2745 EXIST::FUNCTION:
PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata 2746 EXIST::FUNCTION:
HMAC_CTX_init 2747 EXIST::FUNCTION:HMAC
ENGINE_get_digest 2748 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
OCSP_RESPONSE_print 2749 EXIST::FUNCTION:
KRB5_TKTBODY_it 2750 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
KRB5_TKTBODY_it 2750 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_it 2751 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_it 2751 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL_it 2752 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL_it 2752 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
PBE2PARAM_it 2753 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
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